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Cert to CA4 (En bane: Russell 
for ct~ Widener, Hall, 
dissenting) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Petr contends that the CA4 erred in vacating the 
DC's stay of proceedings pending disposition of a parallel state 
court action. 
FACTS: In 1975, Mercury Construction, which is incorporated 
in Del. and has its principal place of business in Ala., and petr 
Hospital, incorporated and doing business in N.C., entered into a 
contract for the construction of hospital additions, which called 
~~~L,t;r~u ~~-~~ 
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for arbitration of all contract-related disputes. The contract 
also provided that disputes first be submitted to the Architect, 
described in the contract as the Hospital's representive. If the 
dispute was not satisfactorily resolved in this manner, the claim 
was required to be submitted to arbitration within a "reasonable 
time" after it arose, and in no event after the claim would be 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
In 1977, as work on the contract was proceeding, the 
Architect asked Mercury to hold certain claims for "delays and 
impact inefficiencies" until after the work was completed. In 
Jan. 1980, after timely completion of the project, Mercury 
submitted its claim for delay and impact costs, and conducted 
negotiations with the Architect which resulted in a reduction of 
the claim in April 1980. However, the Hospital's directors, who 
claimed ignorance of the negotiations, asked for additional 
information from Mercury, and finally agreed to hold a meeting on 
the claim on Oct. 13, 1980. On Oct. 7, 1980, Hospital counsel 
advised Mercury that it would not pay anything on the claim and 
intended to file suit in state court seeking a declaratory 
judgment that (1) it did not have to arbitrate; (2) it owed 
Mercury nothing; and (3) if it was liable to Mercury, then it was 
entitled to recover the amount of its liability from the 
Architect. 
On Oct. 8, 1980, the Hospital filed its action in N.C. state 
court, naming Mercury and the Architect as defendants and 
qlaiming, inter alia, that Mercury had waived its right to 
arbitration and was barred from arbitration because of "laches 
and estoppel." On Oct. 9, Mercury filed a demand for arbitration 
with the Amercian Arbitration Association. On Oct. 15, the state 
,/ 
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court issued an ex parte order barring Mercury from "taking any 
action" toward arbitration of the dispute, but this order was 
dissolved shortly there,ter. On Oct. 27, Mercury filed this 
action in the M.D.N.C. (J. Ward), alleging diversity 
jurisdiction, and seeking an order of arbitration and stay of 
judicial proceedings pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 
U.S.C. §§ 1-9. It also petitioned for removal of the Hospital's 
action to the federal court. 
~ 
On Dec. 24, 1980, the DC remanded the Hospital's suit to the 
state court, finding that the action between Mercury and the 
Hospital was not "separate and independent" from the Hospital's 
claim against the Architect, and that, since the Architect was a 
N.C. corporation, there was not the proper diversity between the 
parties. The DC also stayed the action before it, pending 
resolution of the state court action; it did so because the state 
court suit "involve[d) the identical issue of arbitrability of 
the claims of Mercury ... against the ... Hospital which is 
involved in this action." Mercury sought review in the CA4 both 
by appeal and mandamus. 
HOLDING BELOW: The CA4, sitting en bane, reversed. 1 It held 
first, with virtually no discussion, that the DC's stay order was 
a "final decision" appealable under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. See Amdur 
v 1The proceedings before the CA4 were somewhat unusual. 
Mercury filed both a petition for mandamus and notice of appeal 
on Jan. 7, 1981, and the Hospital moved to dismiss the appeal on 
feb. 3. On Feb. 12, a CA4 panel heard argument on the mandamus 
motion and the parties were directed to brief the issue within 10 
days. However, prior to issuance of an opinion, the CA ordered 
an en bane hearing on the issues of mandamus and appealability, 




v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103 (CA4 1967). It then stated that 
"[t]he real issue in this case, determinative of this 
appeal, is the right of [Mercury] to an order of arbitration 
by the district court of its dispute with the Hospital 
pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, and whether that 
right, if it exists, may be frustrated by the 'reactive' 
filing of a state declaratory action by the Hospital 
asserting the non-arbitrability of the dispute before 
Mercury had any real opportunity to seek arbitration." 
v 
After a lengthy discussion, the CA4 concluded that Mercury was 
entitled under the Federal Arbitration Act to an order of 
arbitration. Moreover, this right to arbitration could not be 
nullified by the pendency of a similar action in state court. 
See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 400 F.Supp. 
8 8 8 , 8 9 o ( N • o . I 11 • 19 7 5) , a ff ' d , 5 41 F • 2d 12 6 3 ( CA 7 19 7 6) . 
The CA4 read Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 
(1978), in light of Justice Blackmun's concurrence, to stand for 
the proposition that "a federal court being seized of 
jurisdiction of a case, [is] not to stay its proceedings in 
deference to a state action unless there [are] 'exceptional 
circumstances• justifying such stay •••• " See Colorado River 
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 
(1976). The CA found no "exceptional circumstances" in this 
case; indeed, the Hospital's "precipitate resort to its state 
action" was calculated to deprive Mercury of a federal forum, and 
to take advantage of N.C. precedent holding that contracts such 
as that between Mercury and the Hospital did not involve 
"interstate commerce" and were thus outside the coverage of the 
Federal Arbitration Act. E.g., Burke Cty. Public Sch. Bd. v. 
Shaver Partner, 265 S.E. 2d 481 (N.C. App. 1980). In light of 
this precedent, it was "doubtful whether the rights of Mercury as 
fixed by 'federal substantive law' [would] be recognized in state 
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court." Therefore, "[t]he loss of [Mercury's] rights as 
established by federal 'substantive law' in arbitration demands 
that the district court not defer here." 
/ J. Hall and J. Widener, in dissent, were "at a loss to 
understand" why the majority had dealt primarily with Mercury's 
substantive rights under the federal Act and only secondarily 
with the propriety of the DC's stay. Mercury and the Hospital 
had presented the identical issues of waiver and arbitrability to 
the state and federal courts, and both courts were capable of 
providing appropriate relief. The Federal Arbitration Act 
contains no requirement that a federal court rule on a petition 
to compel arbitration when it would "thereby duplicat[e] the 
efforts of the state court and possibly contradic[t] its result." 
Moreover, state judges as well as federal judges are capable of 
applying the federal Act. While the pendency of an action in the 
state court is not a bar to proceedings concerning the same 
matter in federal court, Colorado River, supra, at 817, a federal 
court may properly stay its proceedings to avoid piecemeal or 
duplicative litigation, id., at 818. This is particularly so 
when, as here, the federal court's jurisdiction is predicated 
only upon the diversity of citizenship of the parties. 2 Thus, 
the DC did not abuse its discretion in entering the stay. 
J. Widener again dissented from denial of the petition for 
rehearing. He pointed out that the N.C. Sup Ct had recently 
2The CA4 and other CAs have held that the Federal Arbitration 
Act does not establish federal jurisdiction over actions 
asserting rights under the Act. Some independent basis of 
jurisdiction, such as diversity, must be invoked. See Sine v. 
Local 992, Teamsters, 644 F.2d 997, 1001 n.9 (1981). 
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decided Burke Cty, supra, and had overturned those state court 
decisions that had declined to apply the Federal Arbitration Act 
in a similar context. 279 S.E. 2d 816 (1981). Since this 
"should have disabused this court of any notions it may have had 
that the North Carolina courts would not follow the federal 
substantive law," J. Widen er found the denial of rehearing 
"inexplicable." 
J. Russell filed a short response, saying that the dissent 
misconceived the real basis of the CA4 decision, which was simply 
that, absent exceptional circumstances, a federal court should 
not stay an action involving federal law in favor of state 
proceedings. 
PETR'S CONTENTIONS: (1) The CA4 decision conflicts with 
Colorado River, supra. The "exceptional circumstances" which 
Colorado River said would justify a stay exist here: a) the 
identical parties and issues are before the state court; b) one 
of the parties to the underlying dispute--the Architect--is 
before only the state court; c) the state court is the only forum 
in which a comprehensive resolution of all related issues may be 
had. Moreover, Colorado River involved a dismissal of the 
action, not a stay; stays should be more readily available. The 
CA4 decision conflicts with other CA decisions upholding DC stays 
pending disposition of parallel state actions. E.g., State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Scholes, 601 F.2d 1151 (CAl0 1979); 
Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960 (CA2 1980). 
' 
(2) The DC order was not a "final decision" appealable under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Jensensius v. Texaco, Inc., 639 F.2d 1342 (CA5 
1981); State Farm Mutual, supra, at 1153-53; Cotler v. Inter-
County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537 (CA3 1975). See also 
, 
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Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981) (order 
denying motion to disqualify counsel nonappealable); Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (197 8) (order denying class 
action certification nonappealable). Stays are by nature 
tentative, not final; since the DC did not dismiss the action, 
Mercury "remained free to urge reconsideration of [the] decision 
to defer based on new information as to the progress of the state 
case." Will, supra, at 665 (plurality opinion). Congress has 
provided only two avenues for CA review of a DC's stay order: 
certification pursuant to§ 1292(b) (not sought here) or 
mandamus. 
(3) The Court should exercise its supervisory powers under 
Sup Ct Rule 17.1 (a) to remedy the CA4's "wholesale diversion 
from the accepted course of judicial proceedings." The CA heard 
this case on an expedited and irregular schedule, see note 1, 
supra, because of the "extraordinary" nature of the writ sought 
by Mercury. However, the CA then treated the case as a normal 
appeal, and decided the merits of the arbitrability question 
without briefing or argument by the parties. This procedure 
misled the litigants and deprived the Hospital of any meaningful 
opportunity to be heard on the merits of its case. 
RESPONSE: (1) Colorado River, supra, stressed that federal 
courts have a duty to decide cases properly before them, and thus 
supports the CA4 decision. The Federal Arbitration Act was 
in'tended to en sure that the arbitration procedures selected by 
parties to a contract would be "speedy and not subject to delay 
and obstruction in the courts." Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 






was particularly inappropriate for the DC to defer to the state 
court in an action asserting rights under that Act. 
(2) The stay order had "the effect of finality." Once the 
state court ruled on the arbitrability issue, its decision would 
have been res judicata. Thus, the stay would have permanently 
deprived Mercury of the federal forum provided under§ 4 of the 
Arbitration Act, 9 u.s.c. § 4. The CA decisions cited by petr 
are factually dissimilar, in that the stay orders did not have 
the effect of terminating the federal proceeding. 
(3) The CA4 afforded petr an ample opportunity to be heard. 
Petr not only briefed all the issues involved in the appeal, but 
the CA4 also had benefit of the extensive briefs and other 
materials filed with the DC. 
DISCUSSION: Petr's claims are substantial~rst, it is not 
at all clear that the stay order was appealable as a final ~-6-( 
decision under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. The plurality opinion in~ 
supra, at 664-665, suggests that it was not. The rationale of 
the CA4 precedent relied on below, e.g., Amdurs, supra, is that ·a 
stay pending resolution of similar issues in state court has the 
"practical effect" of a dismissal of the action~ however, Coopers 
& Lybrand, supra, rejected the somewhat similar argument that 
denials of class action certification are appealable final 
decisions because they have the effect of "sounding the death 
knell" of the action. Moreover, the CA4 decision conflicts with 
,at least the CAl0 decision in State Farm, supra, which held that 
a similar stay order was reviewable only on petition for 
mandamus. Had the CA4 ruled on Mercury's mandamus petition, it 
presumably would have been limited to the question whether 
Mercury had a "clear and indisputable right" to immediate 
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adjudication of its claims in federal court. Will, supra, at 662 
(plurality opinion); see also id., at 676 (dissent). 
vAs for the propriety of the stay, one could reasonably find 
that there were not "exceptional circumstances" justifying 
deferral to the state court, given the facts that federal law 
applies to the overlapping issues; that petr apparently was 
attempting to keep the matter out of federal court; and that both 
state and federal actions were in the preliminary stages. 
Nevertheless, assuming that the question whether to defer was 
"largely committed to the 'carefully considered judgment'" of the 
DC, Will, supra, at 663 (plurality), one could also question 
whether Mercury had a "clear and indisputable" right to federal 
adjudication that would duplicate state proceedings. See State 
Farm, supra; cf. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 
(1942) (federal court need not engage in duplicative litigation 
involving questions of state law). I agree with the dissenters 
that the CA4 erred insofar as it first sought to determine 
Mercury's rights under the Federal Arbitration Act and then 
implied ~hat the stay was improper because the N.C. courts would 
not adequately enforce those rights. However, J. Russell's 
opinion on the petition for rehearing seemed to retreat from this 
position. 
In all, the Court might want to grant cert if it wishes to 
consider the scope of DC discretion to defer to parallel 
state proceedings. Will, the Court's most recent consideration 
of the issue, produced a fragmented Court; and, following Will, 
the scope of Colorado River's "exceptional circumstances" 
standard is somewhat unclear. On the other hand, it may be that 
there is a limit to the guidance that can be given to the lower 
l' 
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courts in this area, and that these sorts of cases are too 
factually-oriented to warrant extensive review in this Court. 
Given the availability of mandamus, the appealability issue is 
bound up with the question of the standard of review of DC stay 
orders; and I doubt the Court should grant cert to consider 
appealability unless it also intends to review the propriety of 
the stay. The proceedings before the CA4 were not so irregular 
as to require intervention by this Court. 
There is a response. 
February 8, 1982 Rosenblum Opns in petn 
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ABSENT NOT VOTING 
~ . . 
LFP/djb 8/26/82 
No. 81-1203, Moses Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. 
Memorandum to File 
It is not easy to become interested in this case. I hope I 
did not vote to grant certiorari, though the case may be more 
important than it seems. 
This memo will be sketchy and dictated primarily to prompt 
me to read the briefs more carefully, and also our decisions in 
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 
U.S. 800 and Will v. Calvert Fire Insuran~e_f.2-.!_, 437 U.S. 655. 
Petitioner, a North Carolina hospital, entered into a construe-
tion contract with respondent, a Delaware corporation headquartered , 
in Alabama, to build an addition to the hospital. The contract 
provided that ''all claims and disputes ... shall be decided by 
arbitration in accordance with the construction industry arbitration 
\\ 
rules of the American Arbitration Association. A controversy arose 
as to whether delays during construction were caused by the hospital, 
. . 
No. 81-1203 2. 
and respondent filed an arbitration demand against the hospital 
with the American Arbitration Association. The hospital, 




tion from a state court barring respondent from proceeding with -
arbitration until the state court held a trial on the issue of 
arbitrability. 
Respondent did not then file a petition to compel arbitration ~ 
in Federal court, but instead moved the state court to vacate its 
order on the basis of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 u.s.c. 
§§ 1-9. The state court lifted its injunction, and respondent 
thereupon filed in U.S. District Court this case under§ 4 of the 
Act (a petition to compel arbitration), and at the same time 
~ move/, the state court c~se to the same Federal district court. 
Petitioner (the hospital) filed a motion to remand to the 
state court, and also a motion requesting the DC to stay proceedings 
on respondent's petition to compel arbitration. The DC remanded -
the removed action to the state court, and also stayed proceedings 
No. 81-1203 3. 
on respondent's petition to compel arbitration "pending resolution 
of the state court action". The DC made no ruling on respondent's 
r~ to compel arbitration. 
~ z spondent then filed with CA 4, alternatively, a notice of 
appeal under 28 USC § 1291 and a petition seeking a writ of 
'~-.. ~ ... 
:~, m~ndamus requiring the DC to vacate the stay order. 
Relying on the two cases cited above in this memorandum, C,Alf 
CA 4 ..,. en bane , with two judges dissenting, held that the DC 
IJ.c-4, &,I 
had erred in staying proceedings on respondent's petition to ~ 
JA,._ /2_/2u, I 
1 b 't t ' h d . 1 d ~·5 ~ compe ar 1 ra ion. CA 4 found tat respon ent was ent1t e toµ~
/4)~ 
appeal the DC's order because - even though it was not a fina~  
order on its face - it left the DC with nothing to do. 
-------------
CA 4 
further held, on the basis of undisputed facts in the record, 
that respondent was entitled to an order directing arbitration ~ 
under the Federal Act. 
No. 81-1203 4. 
I have recited these proceedings in some detail because 
understanding them is essential even to identifying the issue 
in this curious case. There are a number of CA 4 opinions. 
The panel decision (2 to 1) upheld the action of the DC as 
a ~ xercise of discretion. CA 4, en bane, disagreed with 
the panel, and reversed the DC - with Judges Widener and Hall 
dissenting. The ~ opinions do not seem to be addressing 
even the same issues. 
Similarly, the briefs of the parties state the questions 
quite differently. The principal question on which we granted 
cert, as stated by petitioner is as follows: 
Does a district court have discretion to stay 
' ~
its proceedings in a diversity case pending 
resolution of identical issues by a state court 
having concurrent juris~iction in a prior civil 
action that includes all necessary parties to 
the underlying disputes? 
No. 81-1203 5. 
By contrast, respondent states the primary question as 
follows: 
----
May a federal district court avoid ruling on a 
timely filed petition to compel arbitration filed 
under§ 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act by staying 
proceedings on that petition in order to permit a 
state court, which does not have federal statutory 
authority to compel arbitration, to decide the 
federal issue of arbitrability? 
Petitioner repeatedly emphasizes the duty of appellate courts 
to defer to the discretion of a DC where it stays proceedings in 
f ederal court pending action on the same question by a state court. 
This is said to be required by comity. 
Respondent argues, as did a majority of CA 4, that under the 
two cases above cited, this Court requires a federal court to 
compel arbitration under§ 4 of the Act, where the parties have 
agreed to it, and to permit a state court to decide the federal 
issue of arbitrability only where 
1
~pecial circumstances exist~ - -
No. 81-1203 6 • 
It is said that no special circumstances were identified in this 
case. 
The parties apparently do not deny that state courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction to decide whether arbitration is required. 
Rather, CA 4 en bane, and respondent, read our decisions as 
requiring a federal court to take jurisdiction in the absence of 
special circumstances. See Justice Blackmun's opinion in Will. 
Petitioner responds that CA 4 misread Colorado River and particu-
larly Will, and that CA 7 - on remand in Will - correctly read 
our decision. The difficulty here is that Rehnquist wrote a 
plurality opinion in Will, The Chief Justice and Brennan dissented , 
and were joined between them by 4 Justices. Blackmun wrote an 
opinion concurring with Rehnquist's judgment, but emphasizing 
the need for a showing of special circumstances. 
No. 81-1203 7 • 
My initial impression is that CA 4 probably is right. 
Certainly, respondent's brief - in which former district 
judge Frank McFadden is of counsel - is the stronger brief. 
On the other hand, my general disposition is to support a 
DC's discretion where it stays a federal court pending decision 
of the same issue by a state court. 
This is the sort of question that Justice Rehnquist enjoys 
debating, and I probably will await the Conference discussion 
before having even a tentative view. 
The primary question presented is whether the federal 
district court abused its discretion in staying a proceeding to 
compel arbitration pending resolution of similar issues by a state 
court having prior jurisdiction. 
A subsidiary question presented is whether the stay was a 




In 1975, Mercury and Moses Cone Hospital entered into a 
construction contract. Mercury agreed to construct an addition to 
the hospital under the supervision of an architect selected by Cone. 
The contract contained an arbitration clause covering "[a]ll claims, 
disputes and other matters in question arising out of, or relating 
to, this Contract or the breach thereof." Any claims were to be 
submitted first to the architect, and no demand for arbitration 
could be made until the architect had acted on the claims or had 
been given ten days to do so. The contract required that claims 
would be filed within a "reasonable time" after the claim arose, and 
in no event after the date on which a legal or equitable claim could 
have been filed. 
Construction began in 1975 and was scheduled to be 
completed in 1978. Because of change orders and other work 
problems, work was delayed approximately one year. In 1977, Mercury 
attempted to present a claim for delay and impact costs but was told 
by Cone that it should hold its claim until the job was completed. ~ 
Construction was substantially completed in June, 1979, and Mercury 
submitted its claim to the architect in January, 1980. Settlement 
negotiations began between Mercury and the architect. In May, 1980, 
Cone entered the negotiations, which were continued through October 
to allow Cone to evaluate Mercury's claims. The parties tentatively 
agreed to resume negotiations on October 13. On October 6, 
Me~cury's counsel called to determine the status of the meeting. 
Cone's counsel was uncertain and stated that he would advise Mercury 
the next day. On October 7, Cone's counsel told Mercury that Cone 
did not intend to settle and was filing immediately for a 
declaratory judgment. 
3. 
The next day, Cone filed suit against both Mercury and the ~ -
architect in state court. Cone alleged that Mercury had failed to 
~-. make a timely demand for arbitration and that the architect had been 
~jATr!.k yrJnegligent in not requiring the disposition of claims and disputes 
~ during the course of the work. Cone sought a declaratory judgment 
vf· "that it did not have to arbitrate and that it owed Mercury nothing 
(but that if it did owe Mercury money, the Architect in turn owed 
that money to the Hospital)." Cone also sought and received an ex 
parte order enjoining Mercury from bringing suit to compel 
arbitration. 
~c,, ,)_ 
Mercury requested the state court to disolve the 
injunction, which it did. Mercury then filed a complaint against 
Cone in federal DC, seeking_ ~ or <::!._:_?~Pelling arbitration under§ 
4 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 u.s.c. § 4 (1976). 
Mercury also moved for removal of the state action on the ground -
that the parties in that action were diverse. Following removal, ~ ' 
Cone moved to remand the action to state court because Cone and the 
architect, one of the defendants in the state action, were not 
JI II 
diverse. Cone also requested the DC to stay Mercury's request to 
compel arbitration pending resolution of the state court action. 
,'~ The DC granted both of Cone's requests. It remanded the state case 
I ¥'°-r an~ stayed its own action until the state ~ resolved. The DC 
~A explained its stay by noting that the state "case involves the 







Construction Corp. against the Mose H. Cone Memorial Hospital which 
is involved in [the federal] action. Thus, a stay of this action 
pending resolution of the state court action is appropriate. E.C. 




M!_rc~ ry petitioned the CA4 for mandamus to compel the DC 
to rule on its motion. Alternat ~':._e ~y, Mercury sought to appeal the 
stay as a final order under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. The CA did not rule -- - ----
on the petition for mandamus. It found that the stay was a final 




The CA en bane reversed. It found that Justice Blackmun's 
r\ ~ ncurrence in w: 11 v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U.
1
~ - 655 
C,,I~ ~ (1978), was controlling, and inquired whether there were exceptional 
~ '' V0 c !_E cum~ tanc7ff that would justify the DC's exercise of discretion in 
staying the suit. The CA noted that Mercury's suit was neither a 
contrived federal claim nor a reactive suit designed to delay the 
state litigation. Instead, the CA determined that Cone's suit h~d , 
been filed in state court to deny Mercury its federal right to 
arbitration. The CA noted that state courts had avoided applying 
the federal Arbitration Act by interpreting its terms narrowly, 
·~ ·1 
specifically the question of whether the underlying contract 
. . 
involved interstate commerce. The CA also determined that even 
though there was a state arbitration act that act had not been 
authoritatively interpreted. Because it was doubtful that Mercury 
would receive the benefits of the federal Arbitration Act in state _______ ...., __________________________________ _ 
court, the possible loss qf federal rights demanded that the DC 
proceed with Mercury's suit. Moreover, neither party would be 
~
5. 
prejudiced since the state court had taken no action. Finally, the 
.--. --
CA observed that the DC found no 
justifying a departure from the unflagging obligation of the federal 
court to maintain federal jurisdiction. Absent such findings, the 
DC had no right to stay the proceedings ------- ~~~.Ov 
~ .:l>-----L. - • ~ ~Judge W~dene ~ dis_!!ented.
7 
His dissent w~ ted ~ 
primarily to refuting the biases ~ nderlying the majority opinion. 
~ He noted that the state courts wJt_re bound to aQEl.Y the federal 
~ Ar~ ct ~ d ::e as competent as the federal courts to do 
/ s~ Additionally, the fact that one party does not desire 
arbitration, while the other does, does not mean that one party is 
necessarily right, an assumption that appears to have underlain the 
majority opinion. In contrast to the majority, he found nothing 
__ / 
reprehensible in the fact that Cone had sought to avoid arbitration 
by going to state court. He suspected that Mercury was equally 
guilty of forum shopping. 
Judge Hall also dissented. He agreed that the state 
courts were bound to apply the federal Arbitration Act and competent 
to do so. Although an order to compel arbitration under§ 4 can 
only be attained in DC, the Act's purposes can be served in state 
I I 
court. He found that exceptional ------------
"\ 
circumstances were present since ---.... 
the state court obtained jurisdiction first. Moreover, the presence 
of all the parties before the state court helped prevent piecemeal 
litigation. 
After the CA's decision was issued, the state supreme 
court issued a decision which corrected most of the majority's 
,, 
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concerns about the state courts' willingness to enforce the federal 
Arbitration Act. Cone filed a petition for rehearing based on the 
intervening state decision. The CA4 denied rehearing. The majority 
stated that although it had been concerned about the state courts' 
application of the Act, its holding had rested on the fact that the 
DC had not found any exceptional circumstances which would justify 
staying the federal action. 
B. Whether the DC's stay was proper. ------------~ -
This issue presents two questions. The first concerns the 
proper standard for determining when a DC should stay its action for 
a pending state proceeding; the second, whether under the 
circumstances of this case the DC acted properly. 
Although it might have appeared that Colorado River Water 
Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 {1976), 
established the proper standards for the issuance of a stay, both 
parties continue to disagree over the circumstances that will 
justify a DC's stay pending state proceedings. Cone argues 
indirectly that the signif.icance t_hat Colorado River attached to the 
- . 
federal court's unflagging obligation to exercise its jurisdiction 
should be minimized in deference to considerations of judicial 
economy. Cone accomplishes this result by stressing the factors 
that Colorado River found would justify staying a federal suit while 
failing to mention a federal court's obligation to exercise 
jurisdiction. Cone thus cites Landis v. North American Co., 299 
U.S. 248, 254-55 {1936), for the proposition that the DC's power to 
stay Mercury's suit was incidental to the "power inherent in every 
7 . 
court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with 
economy of time and effort for itself." Similarly, it relies on 
Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942), for the 
proposition that" [g]ratuitous interference with the orderly and 
comprehensive disposition of a state court litigation should be 
avoided". Cone does not attach any significance to the fact that 
the statement in Landis involved one federal court staying its suit 
in deference to another federal court, nor does Cone consider that 
the statement in Brillhart was made in the context of a declaratory 
judgment. In this regard, Cone's argument tracks Justice 
Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will, 
437 U.S. 655 (1978). 
Mercury's argument in response is that Colorado River 
clearly established that a federal court has "an unflagging 
obligation" to exercise jurisdiction and that it should stay its 
exercise only in "exceptional circumstances." Mercury contends that ---the plurality opinion in Will is not binding since Will only 
concerned whether a party's right to a federal court ajudication was , 
so clear and indusputible that mandamus should issue. Will's lax 
application of the exceptional circumstances noted in Colorado River 
would not apply if the question were raised on direct review rather 
than mandamus. 
~~ The Court has considered this issue twicfZl colorado River 
~ l.vV confirmed that DCs have the power to stay their proceedings in 
deference to pending state proceedings. Although some lower federal 
courts had stayed their proceedings prior to Colorado River, the 
power to do so had been questionable in light of previous statements 
8. 
by the Court. See County of Alleghany v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 
U.S. 185, 187 {1959) {a DC "cannot refuse to discharge the 
responsibility, imposed by Congress ••• , to grant prompt justice in 
cases where its diversity jurisdiction has been properly invoked"): 
McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 {1910) {pendency of action 
in state court is no bar to federal jurisdiction). Although 
Colorado River recognized the power, it did so with some caution. 
While factors such as prior jurisdiction over property, 
inconvenience of the federal forum, the desireability of avoiding 
piecemeal litigation, and the order in which jurisdiction was 
obtained could be considered in determining whether wise judicial 
administration counseled in favor of a stay, Colorado River stressed 
that these factors had to be balanced against a federal court's 
unflagging obligation to exercise its jurisdiction. It stated that 
only the clearest of justifications would warrant dismissal. In 
applying this newly defined power, the Court relied on the federal 
policy expressed in the McCarran Act to defer to a prior state 
proceeding. The degree to which the decision in Colorado River 
turned on the presence of this unique factor made it difficult to 
guage how this power should be exercised in more run of the mill~' 
situations. 
The second consideration of this issu~ alvert Fire 
Insurance Co. v. Will, 437 U.S. 655 {1978), failed to produce a 
majority decision. In part, this difficulty resulted from the ----------posture in which Will arose. The DC had stayed a suit brought under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in deference to a pending state 
proceeding. The CA had issued a writ of mandamus to compel the DC 
9. 
to hear the claim. Certiorari was granted to determine the 
propriety of mandamus to review the DC's stay. The plurality in 
Will (Rehnquist, J.) relied on the posture of the suit to uphold 
what was in light of Colorado River a highly questionable decision 
by the DC. Although the posture of the suit provided the basis for 
distinguishing Colorado River, the reasoning adopted by the 
~ diluted the importance of a federal court's obligation to 
exercise its jurisdiction. Relying on Brillhart, the plurality 
indicated that judicial economy was a sufficient justification for a 
federal court to stay its proceeding when a state court had obtained 
prior jurisdiction over an issue. It stated that the "automatic 
exercise" of federal jurisdiction may have been appropriate when 
there was little federal/ state overlap in jurisdiction. However, 
the plurality noted that the growing caseload and interrelation of 
federal and f tate issues justified reconsideration of the 
proposition that a federal court should exercise its jurisdiction. 
Justice Blackmun, who provided the fifth vote, concurred 
in the judgment only. He agreed with the plurality that the 
question of whether to stay a suit was committed to the DC's 
discretion. He took exception, however, with the plurality's 
application of Brillhart to a federal court staying its judgment in 
deference to a state action. 
Justice Brennan dissented. He found the plurality's 
wholesale reliance on Brillhart misplaced. Brillhart was a 
diversity case applying state law. More importantly, the suit in 
Brillhart involved a declaratory judgment. Unlike the statutes 
mandating federal jurisdiction, the statute conferring jurisdiction 
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to issue declaratory judgments makes the exercise of that 
jurisdiction discretionary. Thus, the weight that Brillhart gave to 
the desire to avoid duplicative proceedings was not counterbalanced 
by the unflagging obligation to exercise jurisdiction that was 
present in both Will and in Colorado River. 
The only point settled by Will was one that had been 
A"fa,b suggested by Colorado River, that the determination of whether to 
rr.~ t f d 1 't • • t d th I( I d' • \.) • V.~ J}..I say a e era sui is commit e to e DC s iscretion. Justice 
~J Blackmun and the plurality agreed on this point. Otherwise, Will 
P:~~d'd d · · · (Y'- i not alter Colora o River. If anything, five Justices (Justice 
Blackmun and the four Justices in dissent} agreed that the reasoning 
in Brillhart did not apply to the situation in Will. The reasoning 
t( ~, 
in Will, however, is particularly unsettling since the issue in Will 
was almost 1the converse of that in Colorado River. Although the 
MaCarran Act in Colorado River indicated a congressional intent to 
defer to the court having prior jurisdiction, the federal plaintiff 
in Will sought to have the DC determine a question over which it had 
exclusive jurisdiction under the Securities Act. By finding a stay 
proper in this situation, Will undercut the unflagging obligation 
Colorado River had recognized. 
The issue that Will potentially reopens is the balance a 
federal court should strike in determining whether to stay its 
action. The primary interest in favor of exercising jurisdiction is 
that Congress' grant of jurisdiction carries with it a mandate to 
exercise that jurisdiction when the case is properly before the 
court. This interest is strengthened by the fact that this Court 
bas traditionally interpreted jurisdictional grants in this manner 
and Congress has not seen fit to correct the courts' longstanding 
interpretation. The strongest interest balanced against this is 
that of judicial economy. I agree with Justice Rehnquist that it 
makes little sense to hold two proceedings simultaneously. However, 
the fact that it is uneconomical does not mean that a DC is 
justified in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction. While a federal 
court may be justified in not exercising its jurisdiction in 
exceptional circumstances, the approach advocated by Cone and the 
plurality in Will constitutes a substantial departure from Congress' 
directive. Such a shift in policy is best left in the first 
instance to Congress. Moreover, there seems to be no intervening 
consideration that would justify such an abrupt departure from what 
Colorado River so recently decided. 
The second question raised by the parties is whether -
~
1 
-~ceptional circumstances ~ sted that would justify the district 
#~· ~ t's order staying the litigation. Four factors are raised: 1) 
~ 1/f 
the federal interest in promoting arbitration; 2) the fact that the 
state suit was filed prior to the federal suit; 3) the ability of , 
- . 
the state court to resolve the case completely; and 4) the need to 
discourage forum shopping. 
1. The Federal Interest in the Arbitration Act. 
The first factor derives from the United States 
Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 u.s.c. §§ 1-14 (1976). The Arbitration 
Act has had somewhat of a strange judicial life, having been 
transformed from a remedy applicable only to federal courts to 
substantive federal law applicable to the states as well. The Act, 
passed in 1925, was designed to remedy the courts' refusal to 
/ 
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enforce arbitration agreements and to place arbitration agreements 
on the same footing as other contracts. See Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974). Section 2 of the Act provides 
that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract." Section 3 provides that if any 
suit is brought "in any of the courts of the United States upon any 
issue referable to arbitration," the court shall stay the action 
until the dispute has been arbitrated. Finally, section 4 provides 
that a party aggrieved by the failure of another party to arbitrate 
"may petition any United States district court which, save for such 
agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, for an order 
directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for 
in [the arbitration] agreement." 
The problem in interpreting the nature of the federal 
interest manifested by Congress derives from a disagreement about 
the reasons for which the Act was passed. Although this Court has 
implicitly accepted the proposition that Congress was creating a 
substantive federal rule, the history of the Act suggests otherwise. 
Justice Black's dissent in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), argues persuasively that in 
enacting the Arbitration Act Congress attempted to create a remedy 
which was applicable only in federal courts. As Justice Black 
noted, the drafters of the Act stated repeatedly that "The statute 
establishes a procedure in the Federal courts." See id. at 418. 
Congressman Graham explained the Act to the House: 
' ' 
"It does not involve any new principle of law except to 
provide a simple method ..• in order to give 
enforcement •..• It creates no new legislation, grants no 
new rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement in 
commercial contracts and in admirality contracts." 65 
Cong. Rec. 1931 (1924). 
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Because Congress was acting prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 (1938), it does not appear to have been concerned that 
providing a federal remedy for arbitration agreements in diversity 
cases could have substantive overtones. This difficulty was 
recognized, however, by Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 
(1956). Bernhardt reasoned that the right to recover was a state 
created right, which if enforced through the Arbitration Act could 
result in the parties receiving different results in federal and 
state forums. Bernhardt avoided this dilemma by construing the Act 
narrowly and finding the Act inapplicable to the contract before it. 
Other courts, however, were subsequently faced with the 
dilemma Bernhardt recognized. In Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire 
Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (1959), the CA2 avoided this problem by 
finding that Congress had not meant to provide a remedy. Instead, 
Congress had intended to enact substantive federal law, which would 
provide a federal method of analysis to determine if the contract 
were arbitrable. The result, if not the approach of the CA2 was 
adopted by this Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood~ Conklin 
Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). The majority noted the 
problem raised in Bernhardt but dismissed it: 
"The question in this case, however, is not whether 
Congress may fashion federal substantive rules to govern 
questions arising in simple diversity cases. Rather, the 
question is whether Congress may prescribe how federal 
courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject 
matter over which Congress plainly has the power to 
legislate." 388 U.S. at 405 (citations omitted). 
The majority found that Congress had this power and upheld the 
application of federal contract principles to questions of 
arbitrability arising in diversity jurisdiction. 
14. 
The majority of lower courts appear to have read Prima 
Paint as implicitly accepting the holding of Robert Lawrence that 
Congress intended to create a
7
~ederal substantive right: They have, 
however, not been able to get around the language and legislative 
history of the act which indicate that Congress did not intend the 
Act to provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction. This has 
led to the anamoly that a statute providing federal substantive 
rights can only be heard when there is an independent basis for 
jurisdiction, such as diversity. 
Additionally, because this statute provides a substantive 
federal right some state courts have considered themselves bound by 
the Act. This is in contrast to even the majority's decision in 
Prima Paint, which referred to the Act as applying only to the 
federal courts. This consideration has led to the further anomaly 
that§ 3 of the Act, which provides for a stay in any suit brought 
in "the courts of the United States," has been interpreted to be 
applicable to state courts. However,§ 4, which provides that a 
party may seek to compel arbitration in a "United States district 
court," has obviously not been found applicable to the states. 
The chequered history of the Act has led to both sides 
having colorable claims based on the strength of the federal 
interest present. Cone contends that there can be little federal 
15. 
interest in compelling arbitration in a federal court when§ 4 is 
applicable only if there is an independent basis for federal 
jurisdiction. Because most agreements containing arbitration 
clauses can never be litigated in federal court, there is little 
reason to believe that relegating Mercury to its state court 
remedies contravenes federal policy. Indeed,§ 3 of the Act 
requires a state court to stay its proceedings if Mercury's claim is 
arbitrable. 
Mercury responds that§ 4 of the Act gives DCs the 
exclusive right to compel arbitration. To deny Mercury that right 
is to defeat an important federal interest. Although Mercury could 
obtain a stay of the state proceedings under§ 3 of the Act in state 
court, that fact does not constitute an exceptional circumstance 
that would justify staying the federal case. A state court should 
have concurrent jurisdiction over the federal issues before a stay 
can even be considered. 
Whatever scope Congress intended the Arbitration Act to 
have in the first place, as it is currently interpreted it appears 
to provide some support for Mercury's position. That Congress 
provided a federal right, albeit a limited one, to compel 
arbitration in federal court lends weight to Mercury's claim that 
there is a federal interest in not staying the suit. Certainly, 
there is no indication, as there was in Colorado River, that 
Congress intended to place a condition on the jurisdiction given 
federal courts. 
2. Priority of Filing. 
16. 
Cone argues that when a state court has obtained 
jurisdiction first considerations of comity counsel that a federal 
court should refrain from exercising jurisdiction. Mercury argues 
in response that the state court had not obtained jurisdiction since 
it had never passed on the merits of the dispute relating to 
arbitration. Alternatively, it argues that comity is best served by 
allowing a federal court to pass on federal issues. 
Cone's comity argument is contrary to the Court's analysis 
in Colorado River. In considering whether the DC had the power to 
stay its suit even though abstention was not proper, the Court 
stated: 
Although this case falls within none of the abstention 
categories, there are principles unrelated to 
considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and 
regard for federal state relations which govern in 
situations involving the contemporaneous exercise of 
concurrent jurisdictions ...• " 424 U.S. at 817. 
Because the exercise of federal jurisdiction does not prevent the 
state court from deciding the case, the primary interest that prior 
jurisdiction promotes is prevention of duplicative litigation. This 
interest is strongest when litigation in one forum has proceeded · ' 
farther than it has in another. Indeed, if it were clear that one 
forum would dispose of the case first then there would be little 
reason for the other forum to proceed since the issues would be res 
judicata. In this case, the interest is minimal since neither party 
has done anything other than file complaints in either forum. 
~- Piecemeal Ajudication. 
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Cone contends that deferral was appropriate because the 
state court had all the parties--Cone, Mercury and the architect--
before it and could proceed to determine the whole controversy. 
Because both Cone and the architect were residents of North 
Carolina, the lack of complete diversity between the parties means 
that the state court is the only forum that can avoid piecemeal 
litigation. Mercury responds that the hospital misstates the issue. 
t ,, 
The question is whether Cone and Mercury were obligated to arbitrate 
Mercury's claims against Cone. The DC had all the parties before it 
necessary to decide that issue. 
Because Mercury's claim involves the question of whether 
the case should be in court or before an arbitrator, proceeding in 
' the state forum will not advance the suit greatly. If the case goes 
to arbitration and Cone loses, Cone will still have to return to 
state court and pursue a separate suit for indemnification against 
the architect. If Cone wins there will be no need to return to 
state court. Alternatively, if either court decides that Mercury's 
claim is not arbitrable, proceeding initially in the state court 
will be of little advantage since the issue of arbitrability is 
largely unrelated to the issues of liability and indemnification. 
While switching from the state court to the federal court would be 
inconvenient, the differing nature of the claims presented in each 
forum minimizes the problem of duplicative litigation. 
4. Forum Shopp~. - ...... 
Cone claims that Mercury instituted suit in federal court 
oecause it thought it would obtain a preferable outcome. Mercury 
defends its good faith effort and points to Cone's own lack of 
exemplary behavior. After having negotiated for several months, 
Cone filed suit in state court on short notice in order to defeat 
Mercury's right to arbitration. 
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Although each side appears to have sought a forum that 
would give it a favorable outcome, it does not seem that this is a 
particularly important factor. Presumably any case raising the 
issue of deferral of concurrent jurisdiction will involve two 
parties who have sought what each considers the more favorable 
forum. Of greater importance is whether the federal suit raised a 
frivilous claim or was clearly instituted as a delaying tactic. 
Neither party appears to have engaged in such a tactic. 
If this suit arises on direct appeal and the scope of 
is abuse of discretion, it seems that the circumstances that 
would justify a stay are slight when weighed against a federal 
court's obligation to exercise its jurisdiction. If Mercury should 
~r~ .Pave petitioned for mandamus, the case 
~{ question becomes whether Mercury had a #r 
is obviously closer. The 
clear and indisputable right 
to proceed in federal court. Given the slight factors in favor of 
, ; 
staying the suit, the federal question involved and the obligation 
to exercise jurisdiction, a strong case can be made for mandamus. 
owever, the problem with such an approach is that it may signal a 
elaxation on the use of mandamus. The risk of mandamus being used 
as a substitute for interlocutory appeals seems sufficient to 
approve its use only in the narrowest of situations, such as 
continued or flagrant abuse of discretion. Although denying the use 
of mandamus in this situation could insulate a DC's decision to stay 
a suit, I would prefer to trust the judgment of the DCs than to 
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expand the scope of mandamus. Additionally, this case can be 
distinguished from the dissent in Will, which would have appproved 
the use of mandamus. In Will, Congress had given the federal 
courts' exclusive jurisdiction under the Securities Act of 1934. 
Disregard of that express command justified mandamus. There is no 
similar directive in this case. 
II. 
~vt~ 
cAlf Appealability of the Stay. 1 
~ . 
When the DC stayed Mercury's order, Mercury sought both a 
writ of mandamus and alternatively appeal under 28 u.s.c. §1291. 
The court of appeals did not consider whether mandamus were 
C4'-f-
appropriate. Instead, it unanimously found that the order was 
effectively final and thus ap ealable. The court did not discuss 
the issue but cited its opinion in Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103 
(CA4 1967). In Amdur, the DC had stayed its proceedings pending 
disposition of a related state case. The court of appeals found 
that the stay constituted a final judgment since the plaintiffs 
appeared to be barred by a state bond requirement from pursuing 
their claims in state court. Because the litigants in Amdur were 
effectively precluded from proceeding in state court, Amdur does not 
support the CA's decision squarely. 
There are two arguments why the appeal is proper: the 
federal action was effectively final and the stay was appealable as 
a collateral order. 
Mercury's argument that the stay is effectively final is 
qased on the proposition that once the DC stays its order the state 
court will proceed to resolve the issues raised. Because the state 
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court's resolution will be res judicata, the proceedings in the DC 
will be mooted. Although it it true that the DC retains the power 
to modify its order, there is little reason to believe that it will 
do so. 
Cone relies on the language in the plurality decision in 
Will to argue that a stay differs from a dismissal because the DC 
retains the power to modify its order at any time. Cone notes the 
strict construction given the finality requirement in Coopers!_ 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 u.s. 463 (1978), and argues that Mercury's 
argument is no more than a death knell argument in disguise. Like 
the death knell argument, Mercury's effective finality argument 
requires a case by case determination of finality. The time 
required to determine if the case is final defeats the purpose of 
avoiding unnecessary interlocutory appeals. Finally, Cone argues 
that stay order does not constitute the death knell for the entire 
suit, since Mercury's claims will be heard in state court. 
As a general rule, a suit is final only when the 
litigation has ended and there is nothing left to do but execute the 
judgment. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) ~ 
, 
The cases have recognized, however, that finality is a practical 
rather than a technical concept and have found a small class of 
cases effectively final. Stays have generally not been considered 
to fall within this small class since a stay normally does not 
dispose of the suit but instead merely delays its disposition. Even 
when the stay involves two actions, one federal and the other state, 
sourts have continued to apply the rule that a stay is not a final 
action. See Moore's Federal Practice, 110.20(4). This rule, 
however, has been repeated more frequently than it has been 
discussed. Those cases which have discussed it have offered 
primarily four justifications. The first is that a stay is not 
final since the state court may not rule on the merits; the state 
court may dismiss on a technicality. See Arny v. Philadelphia 
Transportation Co., 266 F.2d 869 (CA3 1959). The persuasiveness of 
this reasoning depends on a empirical assumption, the probability 
that the federal suit will be resumed. It seems to me that the 
probability is extremely low, especially in a stituation in which 
the DC has made an informed decision to stay the federal suit. 
Presumably one of the reasons the stay was issued in the first place 
was because the DC was convinced that the issues could be resolved 
in state court. It is for this reason that the significance of 
Coopers!,_ Lybrand is lessened. Coopers!,_ Lybrand had reasoned that 
a case by case determination of whether a suit had been effectively 
terminated was too great a burden on judicial administration to 
justify allowing appeal when the DC had refused to certify a class. 
In considering whether to grant a stay, however, the DC has already 
made a case by case analysis. The DC's determination that a stay is 
proper may provide a sufficient basis to say that the stay is fi~al. 
A second argument, which is a variation on the first, is 
that the DC retains the power to modify its stay. See Will, supra; 
cf. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. v. Scholes, 601 F.2d 1151, 
1153-54 (CAlO 1979). Although the DC does have this power, it again 
' 
seems highly unlikely that the DC, in the absence of any proceedings 
before it, will be given any reason to exercise that power. 
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The third argument is that making the stay appealable 
defeats one of the purposes which argued in favor of staying the 
case in the first instance. Cf. Acton Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 670 
F.2d 377, 380 {CAl 1982). A stay is often granted to prevent 
duplicative proceedings which waste both the courts' and the 
litigants' time. To allow an appeal as a matter of right in such a 
situtation simply continues the duplicative litigation that the stay 
was designed to prevent. If this is the reason for not allowing 
stays, then it seems that finality is a poor measure to employ. If 
the district court had dismissed Mercury's suit there would be no 
question of finality. Yet, an appeal from a dismissal would defeat 
the purpose of the stay to the same extent that an appeal from a 
stay would. 
The final argument, which is only suggested by the cases, 
is that the stay does not end litigation on the matter. See 
Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962) {stay 
by the DC in deference to state courts when no relevant litigation 
was pending in state court was final since the appellant was 
effectively out of court); Amdur v. Lizars, supra {stay final when ' 
litigant barred from proceeding in state court). These cases 
suggest that a stay is final only if the state court is unavailable 
to continue the inquiry. Thus, although the stay may be final for 
the purposes of the federal forum, it is not final for the purposes 
of the entire litigation. There are two problems with this 
reasoning. The first is that the federal suit is a separate action, 
wpich would be appealable if the DC dismissed rather than stayed the 
suit. If the stay of the federal suit is effectively a dismissal, 
23. 
the fact that there is a pending state proceeding would not seem to 
justify treating the stay any differently than the dismissal. The 
second problem with holding that the entire litigation has not ended 
is that deferring to the state suit defeats a litigant's right to a 
federal determination. While deferral within a unitary system does 
not defeat a litigant's right to have that system decide his claims, 
deferral between two different systems does. 
!/ 
-~ I find Mercury's arguments persuasive that a stay is 
~ effectively a final decision ~and, to the extent that finality is the 
~j~ sole measure of ~ ability, I do not find the other arguments 
:;- persuasive reasons for denying Mercury an appeal in this situation. 
/ Given these two propositions, it would seem that there are two 
possible courses. The first is to say that the stayed action is 
final. I am hesitant to advocate this position, however, because of 
its effect on settled practice, which states that stays within a 
"' w'~ unitary system--i.e., the stay of one federal court in deference to 
~ an~ rt or the stay of a federal court in deference to 
~ :~? a ~ ncy--a~~final. It seems that if a stayed action is 
~ ./ effectively final in a state federal context, it would also be final 
when the staying and proceeding courts are in the same system. 
-------,,---.:::_ IL \-'-
The € alter;~ ~ to focus on the right that is 
lost in this case, the
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fight to have a federal court decide a case 
~ \ \ -------------
properly before it. It is possible to say that a stay in this 
the fa t ~ ter~ 
The test for collateral orders was recently restated in 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S 368 (1981): 
----
"[T]he order must conclusively determine the disputed 
question, resolve an important issue comletely separate 
from the merits of the action and be effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Id. at 
375. 
Z4. 
As in the consideration of effective finality, the most 
troubling question is whether the DC's decision is conclusive since 
the DC retains the power to change its order. Prior cases have 
stated that a right has not been conclusively determined so long as 
the DC retains the right to change its decision. However, these 
cases have arisen in a different setting than the issuance of stay. 
See Firestone Tire.!,_ Rubber v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 381 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Coopers.!,_ Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 
463, 469 (1978); United States v. McDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858-59 
(1978). Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Firestone Tire recognized 
) 
that the possibility that the DC would change its ruling in that 
case was not "merely theoretical." During the course of the trial, 
the DC can determine whether the danger posed by allowing a counsel 
with a conflict of interest to represent one of the parties would be 
actualized. As events unfold at trial the DC may be given a reason 
to reevaluate the correctness of its earlier determination. 
Similarly, McDonald found that the denial of a motion to dismiss ~ 
because the defendant had not been given a speedy trial was not a 
collateral order. It observed that because the alleged prejudice 
could become apparent during the trial, there was a significant 
possibility that the DC would r.~consider its denial. Unlike these 
two cases, the possibility that the DC will reconsider its stay is 
entirely theoretical. There are no ongoing proceedings that will 
9lert the federal court to the need to reconsider its ruling. 
z:,. 
The second condition is also satisfied. The right to have 
a federal court exercise its jurisdiction is completely separate 
from the merits of an action, and it is a right whose importance has 
continually been recognized by this Court. See Colorado River, 
supra. Finally, there is a substantial possibility that the right 
will be unreviewable because the state court proceedings will be res 
judicata. To my mind, relying on the
1
bollateral order doctrine\~ -------~-----------
presents the best resolution of a close issue . 
. --
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: No. 81-1203, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Company 
The complaint filed by Cone in state court alleged that 
arbitration was not required by the contract essentially because ~---------- --
Mercury had failed to submit a timely demand for arbitration. The 
complaint stated: 
"(15) With regard to each of the claims asserted, Mercury 
has not demanded arbitration and has no right under the 
contract to have these claims submitted to arbitration. 
Mercury's inaction with respect to resolving these claims 
in the way and manner required by the contract, its 
dilatory conduct, and its failure to make timely demand 
for arbitration have resulted in substantial prejudice to 
Cone Hospital. Mercury has failed to demand arbitration 
within a reasonable time after each claim arose as 
required by the contract, has failed to demand arbitration 
within the contractual statute of limitations, and has 
failed in general to satisfy conditions precedent to 
arbitration [submission of the claims to the architect]. 
Further, Mercury has waived its right to arbitrate and is 
barred from submitting these claims to arbitration by 
laches and estoppel." JA 24-25. 
Paragraph 2.2.10 in the contract required that "Any claim, 
dispute or other matter that has been submitted to the Architect ... 
shall be subject to arbitration upon the written demand of either 
party." JA 29. The subject of the dispute appears to have been 
within the scope of the arbitration clause. The disputed issue was -------------------------
w~ether Mercury had a claim against Cone under the contract for work 
9~ ~ 




delays and impact costs. As the CA found, "the Hospital [cannot] 1 
contest the fact that it has refused to arbitrate the dispute with cl/-~ 
Mercury over a matter clearly within the arbitration clause of the 
contract." App. to Pet. for Cert. Al3. The only indication that 
Cone claimed that the subject matter of the dispute was not within 
the scope of the arbitration clause occurs in Cone's Response to 
Mercury's Petition to Remove the Case to Federal Court. Mercury had 
alleged that it was entitled to enforce Paragraph 2.2.10, the 
provision requiring arbitration. JA 5. Cone denied "the inference 
that paragraph 2.2.10 of the contract applied to the dispute 
reflected in the State Court complaint at the time the complaint was 
filed." JA 8. This denial would seem to have little weight. 
The CA discusses the applicable case law that has 
developed in the lower courts since Prima Paint v. Flood~ Conklin, 
388 U.S. 395. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A7-Al3. Under this case 
law, the question of whether a party has waived the right to 
arbitrate would present an issue to be decided under substantive .., 
federal law. See, e.g., Halcon International v. Monsanto Australia, -----
446 F.2d at 160-63. It seems to me that the substantive federal law 
question is a quagmire, which should and can be avoided. North 
~ 
Carolina has indicated that it will apply the Federal Arbitration 
Act and substantive federal law. See Burke County Public Schools 
Shaver, 279 S.E.2d 816 (1981). Although North Carolina has not 
addressed whether substantive federal law requires that issues of 
waiver be submitted to the arbitrator, presumably it would follow 
the lead of the circuit courts that have addressed this question. 




need to consider in this case whether the case should have been sent 
back to state court for the state court to decide whether the 
contract provided for arbitration. 
!i 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1203 
MOSES H. CONE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, PETI-
TIONER v. MERCURY CONSTRUCTION 
CORPORATION 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1983] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case, commenced as a petition for an order to compel 
arbitration under § 4 of the United States Arbitration Act of 
1925 (Arbitration Act or Act), 9 U. S. C. § 4, presents the 
question whether, in light of the policies of the Act and of our 
decisions in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. 
United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976) and Will v. Calvert Fire 
Insurance Co., 437 U. S. 655 (1978), the District Court for 
the Middle District of North Carolina properly stayed this di-
versity action pending resolution of a concurrent state-court 
suit. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed 
the stay. 656 F. 2d 933, rehearing denied, 664 F. 2d 936 
(1981). We granted certiorari. 41 "" U. S. "~ 7 (1982). 
We affirm. 
I 
Petitioner Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital ("Hospital") 
is located in Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondent Mer-
cury Construction Corp. ("Mercury"), a construction contrac-
tor, has its principal place of business in Alabama. In July 
1975, Mercury and the Hospital entered into a contract for 
the construction of additions to the Hospital building. The 
contract, drafted by representatives of the Hospital, included 
:5~~ 
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2 MOSES H. CONE HOSPITAL v. MERCURY CONSTR. CORP. 
provisions for resolving disputes arising out of the contract or 
its breach. All disputes involving interpretation of the con-
tract or performance of the construction work were to be re-
ferred in the first instance to J. N. Pease Associates ("Archi-
tect"), an independent architectural firm hired by the Hos-
pital to design and oversee the construction project. With 
certain stated exceptions, 1 any dispute decided by the Archi-
tect (or not decided by it within a stated time) could be sub-
mitted by either party to binding arbitration under a broad 
arbitration clause in the contract: 
"All claims, isputes and other matters in question 
arising out of, or relating to, this Contract or the breach 
thereof, . . . shall be decided by arbitration in accord-
ance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules 
of the American Arbitration Association then obtaining 
unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. This 
agreement to arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable 
under the prevailing arbitration law. The award ren-
dered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment 
may be entered upon it in accordance with applicable law 
in any court having jurisdiction thereof." App. 29-30. 
The contract also specified the time limits for arbitration 
demands. 2 
1 The Architect was given final say on "matters relating to artistic ef-
fect." App. 28-29. The contract also excluded arbitration on any claim 
waived by the making or acceptance of final payment. App. 29. Neither 
of these exceptions is asserted to apply in this case. 
2 The contract provided that no demand for arbitration could be made 
later than thirty days after the Architect's written final decision. In the 
case of arbitrable disputes not subject to submission to the Architect, the 
demand was required to be made "within a reasonable time after the claim 
... has arisen," and in no event after the applicable statute of limitations 
had run. App. 29--30. 
The contract also set a starting time limit for arbitration demands. No 
demand could be made earlier than ten days after presentation of evidence 
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Construction on the project began in July 1975. Perform-
ance was to be completed by October 1979. 3 In fact, con-
struction was substantially completed in February 1979, and 
final inspections were mad~t~ 
At a meeting in October 1977, during construction, at- ~= z-J 
tended by representatives of Mercury, the Hospital, and the -
Architect, Mercury agreed, at the Architect's request, to 
withhold its claims for delay and impact costs (i. e., claims for 
extended overhead or increase in construction costs due to 
delay or inaction by the Hospital) until the work was substan-
tially completed. On this record, the Hospital does not con-
test the existence of this agreement, although it asserts that 
the Architect lacked authority to agree to a delay in presen-
tation of claims or to entertain claims after the contract work 
was completed. / -~ ~ ~ --~ _ / .. ~~ ;> 
In Janua!:Y..-1Jt80, Mercury submitted to the Architect its vV-, 
claims furdelay 'and impact costs. Mercury and the Archi-
tect discussed the claims over several months, substantially 
reducing the amount of the claims. According to the Hospi-
tal, it first learned of the existence of Mercury's claims in 
April 1980; its lawyers assumed active participation in the 
claim procedure in May. The parties differ in their charac-
terizations of the events of the next few months-whether 
there were "ongoing negotiations," or merely an "investiga-
tion" by the Hospital. In any event, it appears from the 
record that lawyers for the Hospital requested additional 
information concerning Mercury's claims. As a result, on 
August 12, 1980, Mercury gave a detailed presentation of its 
claims at a meeting attended by Mercury's representatives 
and lawyers, the Hospital's representatives and lawyers, and 
to the Architect, unless the Architect rendered a written decision before 
that time. App. 29. 
3 The completion date, originally set as November 14, 1978, was ex-
tended to October 1979 by agreement of the parties. 
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representatives of the Architect. Mercury agreed to send 
copies of its files to an expert hired by the Hospital, and the 
parties agreed to meet again on October 13. 
On Q_gtobe_r..6, Mercury's counsel telephoned the Hospital's 
counsel to confirm that the scheduled meeting would go for-
ward. The Hospital's counsel said he would call back the 
next day. When he did, he informed Mercury's counsel that 
theHospital would .,E~!;othing on Mer~ y'~ claim. He also 
said that thellospital mtenaea tofilea decl arafory judgment 
action in North Carolina state court. 
True to its word, the Hospital filed an action on the morn-
ing of October 8 in the Superior Court of Guilford County, 
North Carolina, naming Mercury and the Architect as de-
fendants. The complaint alleged that Mercury's claim was 
without factual or legal basis and that it was barred by the 
statute of limitations. It alleged that Mercury had lost any 
right to arbitration under the contract due to waiver, laches, 
estoppel, and failure to make a timely demand for arbitra-
tion. The complaint also alleged various delinquencies on 
the part of the Architect. As relief, the Hospita!._ sought a 
declaration th t t ere was no ri ht to arbitration; a stay of 
ar 1trat10n; a declaration that the Hospital bore no liability to 
Mercury; and a declaration that if the Hospital should be 
found liable in any respect to Mercury, it would be entitled to 
indemnity from the Architect. The complaint was served on 
Mercury on October 9. On that same day, Mercury's counsel 
mailed a demand for arbitration. 
On October 15, without notice to Mercury, the Hospital ob-
tained an ex parte injunction from the state court forbidding 
Mercury to ta.Ke any s teps directed toward arbitration. 
Mercury objected, and the stay was dissolved on October 27. 
AssoonasUiestay was IITfea , M"ercury filed Uie present ac-
tion in the District Court, seeking an order compelling ar-
bitration under § 4 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 4. 4 
~ ~ 
\~ 'Simultaneously, Mereury filed a petition fo, ,emova! of the Hospital's 
~?~ 
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Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. On the 
Hospital's motion, the District Court stayed Mercury's 
federal-court suit pending resolution of the state-court suit 
because the two suits involved the identical issue of the 
arbitrability of Mercury's claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. 
A-38. 
Mercury sought review of the Distri~ Court's stay by al-
ternative- route~ nofice of appeal ar1Wfr'petition for manda-
mu~ el of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
heard argument in the case, but before the panel issued any 
decision, the Court informed the parties that it would con-
sider the case en bane. After reargument, the en bane 
Court held that it had appellate jurisdiction over the case 
under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. It reversed the District Court's 
stay order and remanded the case to the District Court with 
instructions for entry of an order to arbitrate. -






Before we address the propriety of the District Judge's 
stay order, we must first decide whether that ord~ w~ ap-
pealable to the Court of Appeals under 28 ~C:S1291. 5 
7\rercury sought appellate review through two alternative 
routes-a notice of appeal under § 1291, and a petition for 
mandamus under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651. 6 
state-court action. The District Court remanded the removed case on the 
ground that, because the Hospital and the Architect are both North Caro-
lina corporations, there was no complete diversity. The propriety of the 
removal or remand is not before this Court. 
6 Section 1291 provides in relevant part: 
"The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final de-
cisions of the district courts of the United States, ... except where a di-
rect review may be had in the Supreme Court." 
6 The Hospital argues that because Mercury's filing in the Court of Ap-
peals was styled a petition for mandamus first and a notice of appeal only 
"in the alternative," the Hospital was somehow entitled to have the Court 
of Appeals apply the stricter standards of review that obtain under the 
81-1203-OPINION 
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Mercury expressly stated that its appeal was based only on 
§ 1291, and not on 18 . S. C. § 1292 (relating to interlocu-
t~1L._~p~ls). The Hospital con ends t at t e order ap-
pealeo Fom was not a "final decision" within§ 1291. We dis-
agree and hold that the stay order was final for purposes of 
appellate jurisdiction. 
Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U. S. 713 (1962), is 
instructive in this regard. There the plaintiff brought a fed-
eral suit challenging the constitutionality of a state statute. 
The District Judge declined to convene a three-judge court 
and stayed the~ ral suit under the Pullman abstention 
doctrine. 7 We~ hat the District Court's action was final 
and therefore reviewable by the Court of Appeals, stating: 
"The Court of Appeals properly rejected the argument 
that the order of the District Court 'was not final and 
hence unappealable under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1291, 1292,' 
pointing out that '[a]ppellant was ef£ ctively out of 
court."' Id., at 715, n. 2.8 ..... __.__ 
mandamus procedure before considering any appeal. Brief for Petitioner 
30-31. We do not understand why this order of proceeding would be of 
any benefit to the Hospital; but in any event the contention is frivolous. 
In the first place, Mercury also filed a proper notice of appeal in the Dis-
trict Court, see Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3(a). More fundamentally , a court 
of appeals has no occasion to engage in extraordinary review by mandamus 
"in aid of [its] jurisdictio[n]," 28 U. S. C. § 1651, when it can exercise the 
same review by a contemporaneous ordinary appeal. See, e.g., Hines v. 
D'Artois, 531 F. 2d 726, 732, and n. 10 (CA5 1976). 
' Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). 
8 The plaintiff in Idlewild had requested injunctive relief against en-
forcement of the state statute. Nevertheless, it is clear that neither the 
Court of Appeals nor this Court based the holding of appealability on the 
argument that the District Court had effectively denied injunctive relief. 
See generally 28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(l); Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 
450 U. S. 79 (1981). Section 1292 in terms applies only to interlocutory 
orders, and therefore could hardly have been the basis for a holding that 
the orders were "final." 
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Here, the argument for finality of the District Court's 
order is even clearer-:--Acfistrict court stay pursuant to Pull-
man abstention is entered with the expectation that the fed-
eral litigation will resume in the event that the plaintiff does 
not obtain relief in state court on state-law grounds. 9 Here, 
by contrast, the District Court predicated its stay order on 
its conclusion that the federal and state actions involved "the 
identical issue of arbitrability of the claims of Mercury Con-
struction Corp. against the Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospi-
tal." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-38. That issue of arbitr~bil-
ity was the only substantive i,ssue present in tij_e Tederal suit. 
Hence, a sta~ederal suitpending resolution of the 
state suit meant that there would be no further litigation in 
the federal forum; the state court's judgment on the issue 
would be res judicata. 10 Thus, here, even more surely than 
in Idlewild, Mercury was "effectively out of court." Hence, 
as the Court ol'" Appea1s fiela, Hirs stay orcter amounts to a 
dismissal of the suit. 11 
In any event, if the District Court order was not final for 
9 See England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964). 
10 See, e.g., Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F. 2d 1176, 
1183--1184 (CAll 1981); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Haydu, 637 F. 2d 391, 397-398 (CA5 1981). 
11 See In re Mercury Construction Corp., 656 F. 2d 933, 937-938, and n. 
6 (CA4 1981), citing as dispositive Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F. 2d 103, 105-106 
(CA41967). See also Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 
597 F. 2d 798,808, and n. 15 (CA2 1979); Baltimore Bank for Cooperatives 
v. Farmers Cheese Cooperative, 583 F. 2d 104, 108-109 (CA3 1978); Sun 
Oil Co. of Pennsylvania. v. FEA, 572 F. 2d 867 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. 
1978); Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. Laguna Beach, 547 F. 2d 1092, 1093, 
n. 1 (CA9 1976); Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F. 2d 726, 730-732 (CA5 1976); 
Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corp., 504 F. 2d 836, 838 (CA7 1974) 
(en bane); Druker v. Sullivan, 458 F. 2d 1272, 1274, n. 3 (CAl 1972). But 
see Acton Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 670 F. 2d 377, 380-382 (CAl 1982); State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Scholes, 601 F. 2d 1151, 
1153--1154 (CAlO 1979); Frederick L. v. Thomas, 578 F. 2d 513, 515-516 
(CA3 1978) (dictum). 
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appealability purposes, it was nevertheless appealable within 
the exception to the finality rule under Cohen v. Beneficial 
Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). The factors required to 
show finality under this exception have been summarized as 
follows: 
"To come within the 'small class' of decisions excepted 
from the final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must 
conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an 
important issue completely separate from the merits of 
the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal 
from a final judgment." vCoopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978) (footnote omitted). 12 
There can be no dispute that this order meets the second 
and third of these criteria. An order that amounts to a re-
fusal to adjudicate the merits plainly presents an important 
issue separate from the merits. 13 For the same reason, this 
order would be entirely unreviewable if not appealed now. 
Once the' state court decided the issue of arbitrability, the 
federal court would be bound to honor that determination as 
res judicata. 
The Hospital contends nevertheless that the District 
Court's stay order did not meet the first of the criteria, 
namely that it "conclusively determine the disputed ques-
tion." But this is true only in the-technical sense that every 
order short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the dis-
cretion of the districtjudge. 14 In this case, however, there is 
12 Accord, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 375 
(1981); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U. S. 850, 854-855 (1978); Abney 
v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 658--659 (1977). 
13 The "completely separate from the merits" requirement is a distillation 
of the principle that there should not be piecemeal review of "steps towards 
final judgment in which they will merge." Cohen v. Beneficial Loan 
Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949). In this case, of course, there is no step 
towards final judgment, but a refusal to proceed at all. 
14 See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(b); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, 
1 
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no basis to suppose that the District Judge contemplated any 
reconsideration of his decision to defer to the parallel state-
court suit. He surely would not have made that decision in 
the first instance unless he had expected the state court to 
resolve all relevant issues adequately. It is not clear why 
the Judge chose to stay the case rather than to dismiss it out-
right; for all that the record shows, there was no reason other 
than the form of the Hospital's motion. Whatever the rea-
son, however, the practical effect of his order was entirely 
the same for present purposes, and the order was appealable. 
See infra, at Part IV E. 
III 
We turn now to the rinci al issue to be addressed, namely 
the propriety of the District ourt's decision to stay this fed-
eral suit out of deference to the parallel litigation brought in 
state court. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. 
United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976) provides persuasive guid-
ance in deciding this question. 
Fejieral Practice & Procedure § 4478, at 788-792 (1981). 
v Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), held that the Cohen 
rule did no 1 to a1&lass decertification orde}"because, among other rea-
sons, such an order is m eren y entat1ve under Federal Rule of Civ. 
Procedure 23(c)(l), whichprov1aes that s uch an order may be "altered or 
amended before the decision on the merits." 437 U. S., at 469, and n. 11. 
Of course, as ~~b) Erovides, virtually all interlocutory orders may be 
altered or amende efore final judgment if sufficient cause is shown; yet 
that does not make all pretrial orders "inherently tentative" in the sense of 
that phrase in Coopers & Lybrand. The rationale behind Rule 23(c)(l) is 
that a certification decision should be made '11(a]s soon aspractfcahle," even 
though later events or discoveries may mandate a different result. Many 
other orders, by contrast, are made with the expectation that they will be 
the final word on the subject addressed. Certainly that was the case with 
the order at issue in this case. Extension oNlie reasoning of Coopers & l 
Lybrand beyond the context of Rule 23 (c)(l) to c~ s 
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A 
Colorado River involved the effect of the McCarran 
Amendment, 66 Stat. 560, 43 U. S. C. § 666, on the existence 
and exercise of federal-court jurisdiction to adjudicate federal 
water rights, 28 U. S. C. § 1345. The Amendment waives 
the Government's sovereign immunity to permit the joinder 
of the United States in some state-court suits for the adjudi-
cation of water rights. In Colorado River, however, the 
Government proceeded in Federal District Court, bringing 
.suit against some 1,000 nonfederal water users, seeking a 
declaration of the water rights of certain federal entities and 
Indian tribes. Shortly thereafter, a defendant in that suit 
sought to join the United States in a state-court proceeding 
for the comprehensive adjudication and administration of all 
water rights within the river system that was the subject of 
the federal-court suit. The District Court dismissed the fed-
eral suit, holding that the abstention doctrine required defer-
ence to the state-court proceedings. The Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the suit of the 
United States was within the District Court's jurisdiction 
under 28 U. S. C. § 1345 and that abstention was inappropri-
ate. We reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
affirmed the judgment of the District Court dismissing the 
complaint. 
We began our analysis by examining the abstention doc-
trine in its various forms. We noted: 
"Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is 
the exception, not the rule. 'The doctrine of abstention, 
under which a District Court may decline to exercise or 
postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordi-
nary and narrow exception to the duty of a District 
Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. 
Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justi-
fied under this doctrine only in the exceptional circum-
stances where the order to the parties to repair to the 
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State court would clearly serve an important counter-
vailing interest.' " 15 
After canvassing the three categories of abstention, we con-
cluded that none of them applied to the case at hand. 424 
U. S., at 813-817. 16 
Nevertheless, we held that the District Court's dismissal 
was proper on another ground-one resting not on consider-
ations of state-federal comity or on avoidance of constitu-
tional decisions, as does abstention, but on "considerations of 
'[ w ]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation 
of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litiga-
tion.'" 17 We noted that "'the pendency of an action in the 
state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same mat-
ter in the Federal court having jurisdiction,"' and that the 
federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation ... to 
exercise the jurisdiction given them." 18 We continued: 
"Given this obligation, and the absence of weightier con-
siderations of constitutional adjudication and state-fed-
eral relations, the circumstances permitting the dis-
missal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concur-
rent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial 
administration are considerably more limited than the 
circumstances appropriate for abstention. The former 
circumstances, though exceptional, do nevertheless 
exist." Id., at 818. 
We declined to prescribe a hard and fast rule for dismissals of 
'
5 Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 
U. S. 800, 813 (1976), quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda 
Co., 360 U. S. 185, 18~189 (1959). 
16 There is no contention here that any of the categories of the abstention 
doctrine apply to this case. 
"Colorado River, 424 U.S., at 817, quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. 
C-0-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U. S. 180, 183 (1952). 
18 Colorado River, 424 U.S., at 817, quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 
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this type, but instead described some of the factors relevant 
to the decision. 
"It has been held, for example, that the court first as-
suming jurisdiction over property may exercise that ju-
risdiction to the exclusion of other courts. . . . In as-
sessing the appropriateness of dismissal in the event of 
an exercise of concurrent jurisd· · n, a federal court 
may also consider ch factors I e inconvenience of 
the federal forum, e esirability of avoiding piecemeal 
litigation; and t rder in which jurisdiction was ob-
tained by the concurrent forums. No one factor is nec-
essarily determinative; a carefully considered judgment 
taking into account both the obligation to exercise juris-
diction and the combination of factors counselling against 
that exercise is required. Only the clearest of justifica-
tions wi,ll warrant dismissal." Id., at 818-819 (empha-
sis added; citations omitted). 
As this passage makes clear, the decision whether to dis-
miss a federal action because of parallel state-court hti ation 
does not rest on a mechamca c ec 1s , ut on a careful bal-
ancing of ffiei mportant factors as the a 1§1 in a ven case, 
I 
wi a ance eav1 y weighted in favor of the exercise of 
jurisdiction. The weight to be given to any one factor may 
vary greatly from case to case, depending on the particular 
setting of the case. Colorado River itself illustrates this 
principle in operation. By far the most important factor in 
our decision to approve the dismissal there was the "clear 
federal policy ... [of] avoidance of iecemeal adjudicationof 
water rig s ma river system," i ., at 9, as evmced m the 
McCarran-Amendment. We recognized that the Amend-
ment represents Congress's judgment that the field of water 
rights is one peculiarly appropriate for comprehensive treat-
ment in the forums having the greatest experience and ex-
pertise, assisted by state administrative officers acting under 
the state courts. Id., at 819-820. In addition, we noted 
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that other factors in the case tended to support dismissal-
the absence of any substantial progress in the federal-court 
litigation; the presence in the suit of extensive rights gov-
erned by state law; the geographical inconvenience of the fed-
eral forum; and the Government's previous willingness to liti-
gate similar suits in state court. Id., at 820. 
B 
Before discussing the application of Colorado Rivers ex-
ceptional-circumstances test, we must address the Hospital's 
argument that that test was undermined by our subsequent 
decision in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U. S. 655 
(1978). We find no merit in this argument for at least two 
reasons. 
The Hospital relies on the opinion of JUSTICE REHNQUIST, 
announcing the judgment of the Court in Calvert and speak-
ing for three other Justices. But it is clear that a majority of 
the Justices reaffirmed the Colorado River test in Calvert. 
This majority consisted of the four Justices who joined the 
dissenting opinion, 437 U. S., at 668-669, 672-674 (BREN-
NAN, J., dissenting), and JUSTICE BLACKMUN who, concur-
ring in the judgment, agreed that Colorado River was con-
trolling, but voted to remand to permit the District Court to 
apply the Colorado River factors in the first instance, 19 id., at 
667-668. On remand, the Court of Appeals correctly recog-
nized that the four dissenting Justices and JUSTICE BLACK-
MUN expressed the controlling majority view in this Court's 
decision. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will, 586 F. 2d 12 
(CA7 1978). 
Even on the basis of JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S opinion, there 
is an obvious distinction between Calvert and this case. The 
key to Calvert was the standard for issuance of a writ of man-
19 The decision in Colorado River came down after the District Court's 
stay order in Calvert but before the Court of Appeals issued its mandamus 
in that case. 
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damus under 28 u. s. C. § 1651.20 As JUSTICE REHNQUIST 
stressed, such extraordinary writs are used in aid of appel-
late jurisdiction only to confine an inferior court to a lawful 
exercise of its prescribed authority, or to compel it to exer-
cise its authority when it is its duty to do so. The movant 
must show that his right to the writ is clear and indisputable. 
437 u. s., at 661-662, 664, 665-666 (opinion of REHNQUIST, 
J.). JUSTICE REHNQUIST concluded that that the movant in 
Calvert had failed to meet this burden. At the same time, he 
noted that the movant might have succeeded on a proper ap-
peal. Id., at 665. In this case we have held that the Court 
of Appeals did have appellate jurisdiction; it properly exer-
cised that jurisdiction to find that the District Court's stay 
was impermissible under Colorado River. 
The Hospital further contends that Calvert requires rever-
sal here because the opinions of JUSTICE REHNQUIST and 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN require greater deference to the discre-
tion of the District Court than was given by the Court of Ap-
peals in this case. Under either Calvert or Colorado River, 
of course, the decision whether to defer to the state courts is 
necessarily left to the discretion of the district court in the 
first instance. Yet to say that the district court has discre-
tion is not to say that its decision is unreviewable; such dis-
cretion must be exercised under the relevant standard pre-
scribed by this Court. In this case, the relevant standard is 
Colorado Rivers exceptional-circumstances test, as eluci-
20 The Court of Appeals in Calvert had held that it lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain an ordinary appeal, apparently because a portion of the federal 
litigation was the subject of exclusive federal jurisdiction and would there-
fore remain to be disposed of in federal court after the conclusion of state-
court proceedings. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will, 560 F. 2d 792, 794 
(CA7 1977), citing Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Assn., 526 F. 2d 
537, 540 (CA3 1975). Cf. Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corp., 504 
F. 2d 836,838 (CA71974) (en bane) (stay oflitigation pending exhaustion of 
state remedies is final under Idlewild). The issue of appellate jurisdiction 
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dated by the factors discussed in that case. As we shall now 
explain, we agree with the Court of Ap eals that the District 
Court in this case a use 1 s 1scre 10n m granting t e stay. 
IV 
Applyi~ the Qolorado Riv~_factors to this case, it is clear 
that there was no showfng of the requisite'€xceptional cir-
cumstances ' "to justify tfie District Court's stay. -
The Hospital concedes t~st two factors mentioned 
in Colorado River are not present here. There was no as-
sumption by either court of jurisdiction over any res or prop-
erty, nor is there any contention that the federal forum was 
any less convenient to the parties than the state forum. The 
remaining factors-avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and the 
order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent fo-
rums-far from supporting the stay, actually counsel against 
it. 
A 
There is no force here to the consideration that was para-
mount in~ River itself-the danger of piecemeal 
litigation. 
Tliellospital points out that it has two substantive dis-
putes here-one with Mercury, concerning Mercury's claim 
for delay and impact costs, and the other with the Architect, 
concerning the Hospital's claim for indemnity for any liability 
it may have to Mercury. The latter dispute cannot be sent 
to arbitration without the Architect's consent, since there is 
no arbitration agreement between the Hospital and the Ar-
chitect. It is true, therefore, that if Mercury obtains an ar-
bitration order for its dispute, the Hospital will be forced to 
resolve these related disputes in different forums. That mis-
fortune, however, is not the result of any choice between the 
federal and state courts; it occurs because the relevant fed-
eral law requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give 
effect to an arbitration agreement. 21 Under the Arbitration 
21 This provides a sharp contrast with the key statute at issue in Colo-
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Act, an arbitration agreement must be enforced notwith-
standing the presence of other persons who are parties to the 
underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement. 22 If 
the dispute between Mercury and the Hospital is arbitrable 
under the Act, then the Hospital's two disputes will be re-
solved separately-one in arbitration, and the other (if at all) 
in state-court litigation. Conversely, if the dispute between 
Mercury and the Hospital is not arbitrable, then both dis-
putes will be resolved in state court. But neither of those 
two outcomes depends at all on which court decides the ques-
tion of arbitrability. Hence, a decision to allow that issue to 
be decided in state rather than federal court accomplishes ab-
solutely nothing in the way of avoiding piecemeal resolution 
of disputes. 
B 
The order in which the concurrent tribunals obtained and 
exercised jurisdiction cuts against, not for, the District 
Court's stay in this case. The Hospital argues that the stay 
was proper because the state-court suit was filed some 19 
days before the federal suit. In the first place, this argu-
ment disregards the obvious reason for the Hospital's prior-
ity in filing. An indispensable element of Mercury's cause of 
rado River-the McCarran Amendment. There, as we stressed, the pri-
mary policy of the statute was the avoidance of piecemeal litigation. 424 
U. S., at 819---820. 
'l2 E . g., C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan International Co., 552 F. 2d 1228, 
1231-1232 (CA7 1977); Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Industries, Inc., 514 
F. 2d 614, 617 (CAI 1975); Hamilton Life Insurance Company of New 
York v. Republic National Life Insurance Co., 408 F . 2d 606, 609 (CA2 
1969). 
In some cases, of course, it may be advisable to stay litigation among the 
non-arbitrating parties pending the outcome of the litigation. That deci-
sion is one left to the district court (or to the state trial court under appli-
cable state procedural rules) as a matter of its discretion to control its 
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action under § 4 for an arbitration order is the Hospital's re-
fusal to arbitrate. See n. 26, infra. That refusal did not oc-
cur until less than a day before the Hospital filed its s tate 
suit. Hence, Nrercury"""S1mply Ifad no reasonable opportunity 
tolDe its § 4 petition first. Moreover, the Hospital suc-
ceeded in obtaining an ex parte injunction from the state 
court forbidding Mercury from taking any steps to secure ar-
bitration. 23 Mercury filed its § 4 petition the same day that / ~ 
the injunction was dissolved. 24 / 
That aside, the Hospital's priority argument gives too me-
chanical a reading to the "priority" element of the Colorado 
River balance. This factor, as with the other Colorado 
River factors, is to be applied in a pragmatic, flexible manner 
with a view to the realities of the case at hand. Thus, prior-
ity should not be measured exclusively by which complaint 
was filed first, but rather in terms of how much progress has 
been made in the two actions. Colorado River illustrates 
this point well. There, the federal suit was actually filed 
23 Of course we do not mean to say that the state court's injunction could 
properly have been applied to prevent Mercury from filing or prosecuting a 
federal lawsuit. See General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U. S. 12 (1977); 
Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U. S. 408 (1964). Mercury was not 
obliged, however, to put itself in danger of contempt sanctions merely in 
order to cut short the period of the Hospital's priority of filing. 
24 The Court of Appeals, examining the timing and substance of the par-
ties' filings in these cases, found another powerful argument against the 
District Court's stay: it concluded that, despite chronological priority, the 
Hospital's state-court suit was a contrived, defensive reaction to Mercury's 
claim for relief and for arbitration. 656 F. 2d, at 944-945. This was the 
primary basis on which the lower courts, on remand from our Calvert deci-
sion, decided to continue the stay in that case. Calvert Fire Insurance 
Co . v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co., 600 F. 2d 1228 (CA7 1979). 
While there is some persuasiveness to this argument, we need not rely on 
it. We note only that, at a minimum, Mercury can hardly be accused of 
any bad faith tactics in going to the only forum that (it thought) could 
be counted on to enforce its federal right to arbitration. See infra, at 
Part ND, and nn. 34-35. 
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first. Nevertheless, we pointed out as a factor favoring dis-
missal "the apparent absence of any proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court, other than the filing of the complaint, prior to the 
motion to dismiss." 424 U. S., at 820. Here, the opposite 
was true. It was the state-court suit in which no substantial 
proceedings (excepting only the abortive temporary injunc-
tion) had taken place at the time of the decision to stay. In 
the federal suit, by contrast, the parties had taken most of 
the steps necessary to a resolution of the arbitrability issue. 25 
In realistic terms, the federal suit was running well ahead of 
the state suit at the very time that the District Court decided 
to refuse to adjudicate the case. 
This refusal to proceed was lainly erroneous in view of 
Congress s c ear m en , in the Arbitra 10n ct to move the 
part~ ble dispute out of court and into :rtitra-
tion as qmc y and eas1 y as possible. The Act provides two 
parallel devices for enforcing an arbitration agreement: a 
stay of litigation in any case raising a dispute referrable to 
arbitration, 9 U. S. C. § 3, and an affirmative order to engage 
in arbitration, § 4. Both of these sections call for an expe-
ditious and summary hearing, with only restricted inquiry 
into factual issues. 26 Assuming that the state court would 
25 Under§ 6 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 6, Mercury's application 
for a § 4 order was properly treated procedurally as a motion. Mercury 
submitted affidavits, legal briefs, and documentary evidence in support of 
the order sought. The Hospital responded with full briefing and extensive 
evidentiary submissions on the arbitrability issue, and it requested oral ar-
gument and a jury trial. At the same time, it made its successful motion 
for a stay. It is readily apparent that if the District Court had denied the 
stay, it doubtless could and should have gone on to decide the arbitrability 
point in very short order. 
26 Section 3 provides that if a suit is brought on the merits of a dispute 
covered by an arbitration agreement, 
"the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue 
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an 
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the 
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of 
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have granted prompt relief to Mercury under the Act, 27 there 
still would have been an inevitable delay as a result of the 
District Court's stay. The stay thus frustrated the statutory 
policy of rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration 
agreements. 
C 
Besides the four factors expressly discussed in Colorado 
River, there is another that emerges from Calvert-the fact 
that federal law rovides the rule of decision on the merits. 
The sta e-versus-federal- aw ac or was o ambiguous rele-
vance in Colorado River.'lll In Calvert, however, both the 
four-vote dissenting opinion and JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S opin-
ion concurring in the judgment pointed out that it is ordi-
naril ina ropriate to defer to state courts for the resolution 
of rights u~ e ~ a-E;w, especia ly w ere e era Jurisdic-
tion over the claims at stake is exclusive. 437 U. S., at 667 
the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in pro-
ceeding with such arbitration." 9 U. S. C. § 3. 
Section 4 provides that a district court must enter an order to arbitrate 
"upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or 
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue." If either of these points is 
in issue, § 4 provides that "the court shall proceed summarily" to a trial on 
that point. Section 6 further provides that a request for relief under ei-
ther § 3 or § 4 is to be treated procedurally as a motion. 
Moreover, the policy of the Arbitration Act requires a liberal reading of 
arbitration agreements, see infra, at 19-20. As a result, some issues that 
might be thought relevant to arbitrability are themselves arbitrable-fur-
ther speeding the procedure under §§ 3 and 4. See, e. g., Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395 (1967). 
27 See n. 33, infra; but cf. nn. 34-35, infra. 
28 The federaVstate law point was of little guidance in Colorado River for 
two reasons. First, there was an affirmative policy in federal law ex-
pressly approving litigation of federal water rights in state court-the 
McCarran Amendment. Second, although the water rights of the United 
States and the Indian tribes were governed in part by federal law, the bulk 
of the litigation would necessarily revolve around the state-law water 
rights of the thousand nonfederal parties in the case-a factor on which we 
expressly relied in approving the District Court's stay. 424 U. S., at 820. 
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(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 668-677 
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting). See also Colorado River, 424 
U. S., at 815, n. 21; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 
u. s. 668, 672-674 (1963). 
The basic issue presented in Mercury's federal suit was the 
arbitrablhty of ffie diiwute between Mercury and the Hospi-
tal. Federal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs I 
fA_,,h-, that issue in either state or fe era court. ec 10n 2 1s the 
- { primary substantive provision o the Act, declaring that a 
written agreement to arbitrate "in any maritime transaction 
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce 
... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract." 9 U. S. C. § 2. 29 Section 2 is a congressional 
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or proce-
/ 
dural p<icies to the contrary. The effe t of the section is to 
v1fa-. create a o y o e era substantive aw o ar 1tra 11ty, ap-
Q plicab e o an 1 ration a ent wit!infffi'e coverage of 
the Act. Prima Paint orp. . Flood & Conklin Mfg. 
Corp., 388 U. S. 395 (1967), example, the parties had 
( 
signed a cont · mg an arbitration clause, but one 
party alleged that there had been fraud in the inducement of 
the entire contract (although the alleged fraud did not go to 
the arbitration clause in particular). The issue before us was 
whether the issue of fraud in the inducement was itself an ar- cJ.d" 
bitrable controversy. We held that the language and poli- .J~ _ _,,, ~ 
cies of the Act required the conclusion that the fraud issue is ~-
arbitrable; we re· ected a contrary rule that arbitrability:~ 
governed by state-law ru es o contract inter etation. I'd., , 
at 4 4. t oug our oldmg m Prima Paint extended j 
only to the specific issue presented, the courts of appeals 
have since consistently concluded that questions of 
29 "Maritime transaction" and "commerce" are defined in § 1 of the Ar-
bitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 1. 
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arbitrability must be addressed with a health or the 
federal policy favormg ar 1tration. e agree. Any doubts 
concernmg the scope of ar itrable isslreSShould be resolved 
in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the 
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of 
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability. 30 
To be sure, the source-of-law factor has less significance 
here than in Calvert, since the federal courts' jurisdiction to 
enforce the Arbitration Act is concurrent with that of the 
state courts. 31 But we emphasize that our task in cases such 
as this is not to find some substantial reason for the exercise 
of federal jurisdiction by the district court; rather, the task is 
80 E.g., Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F. 2d 638, 643 (CA7 
1981); Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc., 605 F. 2d 166, 168 (CA5 1979); 
Becker Autoradio U. S. A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F. 
2d 39, 43--45 (CA3 1978); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 174 U. S. App. D. C. 
253, 266, 531 F. 2d 585, 598 (1976); Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Industries, 
Inc., 514 F. 2d 614, 616-617 (CAl 1975); Germany v. River Terminal R. 
Co., 477 F. 2d 546, 547 (CA61973); Coenen v. R. W. Pressprich & Co., 453 
F. 2d 1209, 1211-1212 (CA2), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 949 (1972); Hart v. 
Orion Insurance Co., 453 F. 2d 1358, 1360-1361 (CAlO 1971). 
31 See n. 33, infra. 
The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-
court jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establish-
ing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does 
not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) or otherwise. Section 4 provides for an order 
compelling arbitration only when the federal district court would have ju-
risdiction over a suit on the underlying dispute; hence, there must be diver-
sity of citizenship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction 
before the order can issue. E.g., Commercial Metals Co. v. Balfour, 
Guthrie, & Co., 577 F. 2d 264, 26S--269 (CA5 1978), and cases cited. Sec-
tion 3 likewise limits the federal courts to the extent that a federal court 
cannot stay a suit pending before it unless there is such a suit in existence. 
Nevertheless, although enforcement of the Act is left in large part to the 
state courts, it nevertheless represents federal policy to be vindicated by 
the federal courts where otherwise appropriate. 
We need not address whether a federal court might stay a state-court 
suit pending arbitration under 28 U. S. C. § 2283. 
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to ascertain whether there exist "exceptional" circumstances, 
the "clearest of justifications," that can suffice under Colo-
rado River to justify the surrender of that jurisdiction. The 
mere fact that state law governs the merits is not alone 
enough to warrant that surrender; whereas the fact that fed-
eral law governs should be a major consideration militating 
against it. 32 
D 
Finally, in this case an important reason against allowing a 
stay is the probable inadequacy of the state-court proceeding 
to~"tits.' We areriotto 6e un<ferstooa £o 
impeach the competence or procedures of the North Carolina 
courts. Moreover, state courts, as much as federal courts, 
are obliged to grant stays of litigation under § 3 of the Ar-
bitration Act. 33 It is less clear, however, whether the same 
is true of an order to compel arbitration under § 4 of the Act. 34 
32 Cf. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co., 
600 F. 2d 1228 (CA7 1979) (appeal after remand from this Court), approv-
ing a stay where the supposed federal claim brought in federal court was 
"contrived." See also n. 24, supra. 
33 Although § 3 refers ambiguously to a suit "in any of the courts of the 
United States," the state courts have almost unanimously recognized that 
the stay provision of § 3 applies to suits in state as well as federal courts, 
requiring them to issue the same speedy relief when a dispute is referrable 
to arbitration. (The North Carolina Supreme Court has so held, although 
not until after the District Court ordered this stay. Burke County Public 
Schools Board of Education v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E. 
2d 816 (1981).) This is necessary to carry out Congress's intent to man-
date enforcement of all covered arbitration agreements; Congress can 
hardly have meant that an agreement to arbitrate can be enforced against a 
party who attempts to litigate an arbitrable dispute in federal court but not 
against one who sues on the same dispute in state court. See also Prima 
Paint, 388 U. S., at 404. 
84 Section 4, unlike § 3, speaks only of a petition to "any United States 
district court." Nonetheless, at least one state court has held that§ 4 does 
require state courts to issue § 4 orders to arbitrate where the section's con-
ditions are met. Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 67 
Cal. App. 3d 19, 24-25, 136 Cal. Rptr. 378, 380-381 (1977). 
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We need not resolve that uestion here; it suffices to say that 
there was, a a mm1mum, substantial room for doubt that 
Mercury coulaobtafn from the state courfan order compel-
ling e ospital o arb1tra e. n many cases, no doubt, a 
§ 3 stay is qu~ to protect the right to arbitration. 
But in a case such as this, where the party opposing arbitra-
tion is the one from whom payment or performance is sought, 
a s_tay of liti@tion aloEe is not__ enough. It leaves the recalci-
trapt part~ee to s1tana ao nothing-ne1tlier fo hfagate nor 
to arbitrate. lf tne state courtstayed litigation pending ar-
bitration but declined to compel the Hospital to arbitrate, 
Mercury would have no sure way to proceed with its claims 
except to return to federal court to obtain a § 4 order-a 
pointless and wasteful burden on the supposedly summary 
and speedy procedures prescribed by the Arbitration Act. 
E 
The Hospital argues that the Colorado River test is some-
how inapplicable because in this case the District Court 
merely stayed the federal litigation rather than dismissing 
the suit outright, as in Colorado River. It contends that 
Mercury remains free to seek to reopen the federal suit on a 
showing that the state suit has failed to adjudicate its rights, 
86 As a historical matter, there was considerable doubt at the time of the 
District Court's stay that the North Carolina court would have granted 
even a § 3 stay of litigation. The then-controlling precedent in North Car-
olina was to the effect that a contract such as that between Mercury and 
the Hospital was not subject to the Arbitration Act at all, on the reasoning 
that a construction project is not "commerce" within the meaning of §§ 1 
and 2 of the Act. Burke County Public Schools Board of Education v. 
Shaver Partnership, 46 N.C. App. 573, 265 S.E. 2d 481 (1980); Bryant-
Durham Electric Co. v. Durham County Hospital Corp., 42 N.C. App. 
351, 256 S.E. 2d 529 (1979). The North Carolina Supreme Court has, how-
ever, since repudiated those decisions. Burke County Public Schools 
Board of Education v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E. 2d 816 
(1981). 
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and that a stay is less onerous than a dismissal. We have 
already rejected this distinction, for purposes of this case, in 
discussing appellate jurisdiction. Supra, at 8-9. We reject 
it in this context for the same reasons. 
We have no occasion in this case to decide whether a dis-
missal or a stay should normally be the preferred course of 
action when a district court properly finds that Colorado 
River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 
U. S. 800 (1976) counsels in favor of deferring to a parallel 
state court suit. We can say, however, that a stay is as 
much a refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction as a dismissal. 
When a district court decides to dismiss or stay under Colo-
rado River, it presumably concludes that the parallel state-
court litigation will be an adequate vehicle for the complete 
and prompt resolution of the issues between the parties. If 
there is any substantial doubt as to this, it would be a serious 
abuse of discretion to grant the stay or dismissal at all. See 
supra, at Part IV D; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 
U. S. 668, 674-676 (1963). Thus, the decision to invoke Col-
orado River necessarily contemplates that the federal court 
will have nothing further to do in resolving any substantive 
part of the case, whether it stays or dismisses. See 17 C. 
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Proce-
dure § 4247, at 517-519 (1978). 
Moreover, assuming that for some unexpected reason the 
state forum does turn out to be inadequate in some respect, 
the Hospital's argument fails to make out any genuine differ-
ence between a stay and a dismissal. It is true that Mercury 
could seek to return to federal court if it proved necessary; 
but that would be equally true if the District Court had dis-
missed the case. It is highly questionable whether this this 
Court would have approved a dismissal of a federal suit in 
Colorado River (or in any of the abstention cases, see supra, 
at 10-11) if the federal courts did not remain open to a dis-
missed plaintiff who later demonstrated the inadequacy of 
the state forum. 
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V 
In addition to reversing the District Court's stay, the 
Court of Appeals decided that the underlying co:g_tractual dis-
pute between ~he Ros ital rs arbitrabTe under 
t e 1tra 10n ct an the terms of e parties' arbitration 
agreement. It reversed the District Court's judgment and 
remanded the case "with instructions to proceed in confor-
mity herewith." 656 F. 2d, at 946. In effect, the Court of 
Appeals directed the District Court to enter a § 4 order to 
arbitrate. 
In this Court, the Hospital does not contest the substan-
tive correctness o e ou o ea s s o din on 
ar 1tra 1 ity. It does raise several objections to the proce-
d he Court of Appeals used in considering and deciding 
this case. We are not dis osed to disturb the Court's discre-
tion in its nandling of case. 8 . 2106 gives the 
co s o appeals some latitude in entering an order to 
achieve justice in the circumstances. The Arbitration Act 
calls for a summary and speedy disposition of motions or peti-
tions to enforce arbitration claus~-=;t:rhe Court of Appeals 
had full briefs and evidenti ub · ions from both parties 
on the merits of arbit · 1ty, and held that there were no dis-
puted issues of requiring a jury trial before a § 4 order 
could iss . Under these circumstances, the Court acted 
wit · s authority in deciding the legal issues presented in 
er to facilitate the prompt arbitration that Congress 
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cc: The Conference 
drk 12/29/82 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: No. 81-1203, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Company 
I have no problems with Justice Brennan's treatment of the 
main issue presented by the case, whether the DC should have stayed 
its action in deference to the pending state court proceeding. I do 
have a couple of problems with subsidiary issues: the opinion's 
treatment of finality (pp. 5-9), its treatment of the Arbitration 
Act (pp. 19-22), and its approval of the CA4's action on the merits 
(p. 25). 
1. Finality 
I would have preferred to see the opinion restrict the 
discussion of finality to the collateral order doctrine announce9 ,in 
Cohen. Holding that the stay order was itself final since the 
litigants were "effectively out of court" may invite more litigation 
over whether particular ~ s were themselves final. On this 
point, I would note that Idlewild Liquor Corp. is not persuasive 
authority. What the opinion casts as a holding is a footnote to a 
-------~-----------per curiam opinion. 
2. 
With respect to the opinion's discussion of the collateral 
order doctrine, I have some problem with its treatment of the second 
prong of the Cohen test. It states that "[a]n order that amounts to 
a refusal to adjudicate the merits plainly presents an important 
issue separate from the merits." I would think that many orders 
refusing to adjudicate the merits may not amount to "important" 
issues separate from the merits. A DC may refuse to adjudicate the 
merits because it finds that the issue was not raised in the 
complaint or may refuse to amend the complaint to include an issue. 
I would be loath to say that these are the type of issues that are -------------~-----------------'-
final for purposes of the collateral order doctrine. Rather than 
announce a broad principle, it would seem less disruptive to say 
that in this case, the right to an adjudication in a federal forum 
is the "important issue" that is resolved by the DC's action. 
I also am troubled by the opinion's limitation of Coopers 
-- --
& Lybrand in note 14 to class decertification orders. I find the 
reasoning in Coopers a salutory effort to avoid making every 
decision by the DC a final order for purposes of §1291. I would not 
treat Coopers as the exception to the rule of finality. Instead, it 
would seem that this case should be the exception to Coopers. 
B. The Arbitration Act 
The scope of the Arbitration Act is a difficult question 
that is clouded by this Court's ambiguous decision in Prima Paint. 
I am not sure that, in ligh b of Prima Paint, the opinion's ----discussion of the Act is necessarily incorrect. Its discussion does 
seem, however, unnecessary to the decision. Since the North 
3. 
Carolina courts state that they would apply the Federal Arbitration 
Act, there is no consideration, such as the application of state 
contract law by state courts, that would cut in favor of the DC's 
J( 
cision to sta;_ the suit. Because the parties concede that federal f -
law would apply, the application of federal law favors resolution in 
~ -~ der : 1 _i orum. T~e opinion need not go any further. Rather than 
give this Court's imprimatur to the veiled suggestion in Prima<Paint 
\.' 
that the~~ rbitration Act creates federal contract law, I would ~- , 
prefer to wait until the issue is presented squarely. 
C. Approval of the CA4' s discuss ion on the merits { (/J ~ - f' 2.~ 
The only issue appealed to the CA4 was whether the DC 
abused its discretion in staying Mercury's suit to compel 
arbitration. not only discussed this issue but also reached 
extended discussion. The 
excessive to me and best left unmentioned. The 
pinion instead reaches out and approves the CA4's action. Both the 
action and the opinion's approval of it seem unnecessary. 
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No. 81-1203 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital 
v. Mercury Construction Corp. 
Dear Bill, 
I will await the dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
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Dear Bill, 
I agree. 
Sincerely yours, qy~ 
Justice Brennan 
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81-1203 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. ~ercur.y 
. ' 
. ' ', 
Dear Bill: 
I agree with your holding ana most of your 
opinion. 
I do have a couple of concPrns. On the finality 
issue, I have thought that the collateral order doctr'ne 
announced in Cohen was all we need rely on. I am inclined 
to agree in this case that under the state court's order, 
Mercury was "effectively out of court". But expre~sing this 
view may invite future litigation as to whether particular 
orders were final. Idlewild Liquor Core. really did not 
focus on thi~ question except offhandedlv in a single 
footnote. 
In Part II, you conclude inn. 11 with a discus-
sion of Coopers & Lybrand. The final sentencP. in the foot-
note can be read as limiting the reasoning of that case to 
class decertification orders. I would think that it is un-
wise - certainly it is unnecei:Jl=;J:\J:'V - to Umi t Coooers' rea-
soning to class decertification or~ers. Putting lt differ-
ently, I would not like to say in this case that Coopers 
created an exception to the rule of finality. Inceed, one 
could view this case as an exception to Coopers. Perhaps 
you could omit the final sentence or have it say: "Accord-
ingly, the reasoninq of Coopers & Lybrand is inappl i.cable". 
In Part II-C (p. 20) the sentence beginning seven 
lines from the bottom of the page ("We held that ••• ") may 
be read more broanly than perhaps we would intend. It sug-
gests that all matters pertaininq to arbitrability under the 
federal Act are governed by a federal law of contracts. 
Since normally interpretation of contracts remains a state 
'law matter, it wonld helo me if you simplv omitted the por-
tion of the sentence following the semicolon. This is all 
we really need say here. 
• 1'1 
<-,·' 1' 
;i""~-r 1·. t 
' 
2. 
Finally, Bill, Part V ~ecides here the substantive 
issue of arbitrability. As the only issue appealed to CA4 
was whether the DC abused its discretion, I suppose that 
normally we would simply remand on the merits of the contro-
versy. For the reasons you state, however., I agree that we 
are justified in disposing of the merits. What would you 
think of a~ding, however, the following at the end of the 
second sentence in the second paragraph on page 25: 
q, 
"The only issue appealed to CA4 was whether 
the DC abused its discretion in staying Mer-
cury's sujt to compel arbitration. As we 
affirm on thiq issuP, normally we would re-
mand on the mertis of availability. But we 
are not disposed to disturb the discretion of 
the Court of Appeals in its disposition of 
this ca~e." 
'Nj 
I do not think the foregoing suggestions, if 
acceptable, woulcl affect ln any way the excellence of your 
opinion that I expect to join . 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
January 5, 1983 
Re: Moses Cone Hospital v. Mercury, No. 81-1203 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for your helpful letter concerning my 
first draft in the above case. While I am not yet 
settled whether I agree with all of your proposed 
- changes, I may well decide to do as you suggest. For 
now, however, let me share with you my reservations about 
some of them. 
It is probably true, as you say, that Idlewild dealt 
with finality offhandedly. Nonetheless, several Circuits 
have accepted Idlewild as authority for a per se rule 
that abstention orders and similar stays (such as 
exhaustion and Colorado River stays) are final. 
Offhanded or not, I think Idlewild's rule is sound and 
ought to be non-offhandedly reaffirmed by us. Perhaps 
your concerns about future litigation can be allayed by 
including language limiting our Idlewild discussion to 
abstention and close analogs thereof. Indeed, such a 
bright-line rule seems less likely to foster future 
litigation than reliance on the Cohen doctrine, muddied 
as the latter is by Coopers & Lybrand. 
-2-
Turning to that case, and to footnote 14 on pp. 8-9: 
I am nearly as reluctant to expand Coopers & Lybrand as 
you are to limit it. I agree that the reasoning of 
Coopers might well be applied outside the narrow Rule 23 
context--to many discovery orders, for example. Yet I 
have some difficulty in seeing _ how best to do so without 
consuming the entire Cohen doctrine in the process. 
Would it meet your objections to substitute the following 
for the final sentence? "The reasoning of Coopers & 
Lybrand does not reach all pretrial orders that are 
formally subject to revision, b~t only those as to which 
some revision might reasonably be expected in the 
ordinary course of litigation." 
Concerning the discussion on page 20: It is true 
that interpretation of contracts is ordinarily a matter 
of state law. But that is not always so--the best 
counterexample being collective bargaining agreements, 
which are interpreted as a matter of federal labor law. 
My understanding is that, at least to some limited 
extent, the same is true of arbitration clauses in 
contracts that are within the coverage of the Arbitration 
Act. Several of the cases cited in my footnote 30 say so 
explicitly. Indeed, I think the remainder of the 
paragraph in question makes that clear. To hold, as we 
did in Prima Paint, that "the language and policies of 
the Act required the conclusion that the fraud issue is 
I 
i 
. . "· ·.i 
'\ 
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arbitrable" {p. 20) is necessarily to hold that the 
arbitrability issue is governed by federal law: we did 
indeed reject the contrary 1st Circuit rule that state 
law governed the point. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395, 
402-03. The rest of the paragraph in my draft {pp. 20-
21) goes on to describe the rule governing such questions 
generally: 
"[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with 
a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring 
arbitration ...• Any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the 
construction of the contract language itself or an 
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to 
arbitrability." 
That is itself the statement of a federal substantive 
rule: I am not sure why we should not say so directly. 
In Part V, I think you and I may have understood 
CA4's disposition differently. Certainly it was not my 
intention that we should decide the substantive issue of 
arbitrability: indeed, I made a point of saying that 
arbitrability itself was not an issue properly before us. 
My understanding was that the CA4 has already decided 
that issue definitively, see App. to Pet. for Cert. at 
A6-Al3, and I think that its decision should stand, 
absent some procedural impropriety. However, I think 
something along the lines of your suggested addition 








sentences in place of the present third sentence of the 
second paragraph? 
"In particular, it points out that the only issue 
formally appealed to the Court of Appeals was the 
propriety of the District Court's stay order. 
Ordinarily, we would not expect the Court of Appeals to 
pass on issues not decided in the District Court. In 
the present case, however, we are not disposed to 
disturb the Court's discretion in its handling of the 
case in view of the special interests at stake and the 
apparent lack of any prejudice to the parties." 
Again, I appreciate your comments, and I look 
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Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for your helpful letter concerning my 
first draft in the above case. While I am not yet 
settled whether I agree with all of your proposed 
changes, I may well decide to do as you suggest. For 
now, however, let me share with you my reservations about 
some of them. 
It is probably true, as you say, that Idlewild dealt 
with finality offhandedly. Nonetheless, several Circuits 
have accepted Idlewild as authority for a per se rule 
that abstention orders and similar stays (such as 
exhaustion and Colorado River stays) are f.lnal. 
Offhanded or not, I think Idlewild's rule is sound and 
ought to be non-offhandedly reaffirmed by us. Perhaps 
your concerns about future litigation can be allayed by -
including language limiting our Idlewild discussion to 
abstention and close analogs thereof. Indeed, such a 
bright-line rule seems less likely to foster future 
ljtigation than reliance on the Cohen doctrine, muddied 
as the latter is by Coopers & Lybrand. 
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Turning to that case, and to footnote 14 on pp. 8-9: 
I am nearly as reluctant to expand Coopers & Lybrand as 
you are to limit it. I agree that the reasoning of 
Coopers might well be applied outside the narrow Rule 23 
context--to many discovery orders, for example. Yet I 
have some difficulty in seeing how best to do so without 
consuming the entire Cohen doctrine in the process. 
would it meet your objections to substitute the following 
~ ._ 
for the final sentence? "The reasoning of Coopers & 
Lybiand does not reach all pretrial orders that are 
formally subject to revision, but only those as to which 
some revision might reasonably be expected in the 
ordinary course of litigation." 
Concerning the discussion on page 20: It is true 
that interpretation of contracts is ordinarily a matter 
of state law. But that is not always so--the best 
counterexample being collective bargaining agreements, 
which are interpreted as a matter of federal labor law. 
My understanding is that, at least to some limited 
extent, the same is true of arbitration clauses in 
contracts that are within the coverage of the Arbitration 
Act. Several of the cases cited in my footnote 30 say so 
explicitly. Indeed, I think the remainder of the 
paragraph in question makes that clear. To hold, as we 
dfd in Prima Paint, that "the language and policies of 
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arbitrable" (p. 20) is necessarily to hold that the 
arbitrability issue is governed by federal law; we did 
indeed reject the contrary 1st Circuit rule that state 
law governed the point. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395, 
402-03. The rest of the paragraph in my draft (pp. 20-
21) goes on to describe the rule governing such questions 
generally: 
"[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with 
a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring 
arbitration •••• Any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be . resolved in favor of 
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the 
construction of the contract language itself or an 
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to 
arbitrability." 
That is itself the statement of a federal substantive 
rule; I am not sure why we should not say so directly. 
In Part V, I think you and I may have understood 
CA4's disposition differently. Certainly it was not my 
intention that we should decide the substantive issue of 
arbitrability; indeed, I made a point of saying that ~ 
arbitrability itself was not an issue properly before us. 
My understanding was that the CA4 has already decided 
that issue definitively, see App. to Pet. for Cert. at 
A6-Al3, and I think that its decision should stand, 
absent some procedural impropriety. However, I think 
something along the lines of your suggested addition 











sentences in place of the present third sentence of the 
second paragraph? 
"In particular, it points out that the only i ssue 
formally appealed to the Court of Appeals was the 
propriety of the District Court's stay order. 1\ 
Ordinarily, we would not expect the Court of Appeals to 
pass on issues not decided in the District Court. In 
the present case, however, we are not disposed to 
disturb the Court's discretion in its handling of the 
case in view of the special interests at stake and the l 
apparent lack of any prejudice to the parties." 
Again, I appreciate your comments, and I look 







To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: No. 81-1203, Moses Cone Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co. 
The two specific changes proposed by Justice Brennan seem 
fine to me. The proposed ~ nge in footnote 14 will not restrict 
Coopers & Lybrand automatically to the context of Rule 23, but to 
situations in which the orders will be subject to future revision. 
~ 
Similarly, the proposed change to part V appears to satisfy the 
concerns expressed in your letter. 
While I would be happier if the opinion relied solely on 
v 
the Cohen doctrine, Justice Brennan states that he will draft 
language limiting the discussion of Idlewild to abstention cases to 
create a "bright line rule." Because it seems that certainty is a 
high value in determining what orders are final, this suggestion· 
seems acceptable to me. 
The more troublesome point is Justice Brennan's reluctance 
to make your suggested change in his discussion of the Arbitration 
Act. The disputed phrase seems unnecessary to his argument since, 
as he points out, the remainder of the paragraph makes clear that 
"questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard 
for the federal policy favoring arbitration." Having stated the 
general principle, there is no need to state a broad rule that 
2 • 
"arbitrability is [not] governed by state-law rules of contract 
interpretation." Rather, the lower courts should be left to apply 
the general principle on a case by case basis. The difference seems 
one of emphasis and the results indeed may be the same whether the 
phrase is included or not. It seems, however, that the omission of 
the phrase leaves the lower courts freer to explore the application 
of the principle. 
My recommendation is to accept Justice Brennan's suggested 
changes, including the bright line limitation on Idlewild. Would a 
join with a separate letter explaining why you would prefer that he 
drop the phrase in the Arbitration Act section be effective in 
achieving what you want. 
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:J I appreciate your willingness to make the changes 
indicate~ 1 n your letter of January 5. -~ 
Your proposed changes in fn. 14 and in Part V are 
satisfactory. The same is true with respect to your sugges- · 
tion of limiting the discussion of Idlewil<l to abstention 
and analogous cases to create a "bright line rule". 
I still hope you will consider omitting the phrase 
I mentioned in your discussion of the Arbitration Act. It 
seems unnecessary, as the remainner of the paragraph (as you 
note) makes clear that "questions of arbitrability must be 
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy fa- , 
voring arbi .. tration". . 'w.~ :_ 
Having stated this general principle, there is no 
need to state a broad rule "that arbitrability is [not] gov-
erned by state law rulesof contract interpretation". Would 
it not be well to allow the courts to apply the general 
principle on a case-by-case basis. 
I nevertheless think you have a fine oplnion, and 














JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
,ju.ptmtt <4aurt af flrt ~h _itattg 
,ru~ J. <4. 21lffe~~ 
January 7, 1983 
Re: Moses Cone Hospital v. Mercury, No. 81-1203 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you once again for your letter and your join. On 
reflection, I have decided to adopt your suggested change to 
my discussion of Prima Paint. A circulation incorporating 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1203 
MOSES H. CONE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, PETI-
TIONER v. MERCURY CONSTRUCTION 
CORPORATION 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
[January -, 1983) 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case, commenced as a petition for an order to compel 
arbitration under § 4 of the United States Arbitration Act of 
1925 (Arbitration Act or Act), 9 U. S. C. § 4, presents the 
question whether, in light of the policies of the Act and of our 
decisions in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. 
United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976), and Will v. Calvert Fire 
Insurance Co., 437 U. S. 655 (1978), the District Court for 
the Middle District of North Carolina properly stayed this di-
versity action pending resolution of a concurrent state-court 
suit. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed 
the stay. 656 F. 2d 933, rehearing denied, 664 F. 2d 936 
(1981). We granted certiorari. 455 U. S. 937 (1982). We 
affirm. 
I 
Petitioner Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital ("Hospital") 
is located in Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondent Mer-
cury Construction Corp. ("Mercury"), a construction contrac-
tor, has its principal place of business in Alabama. In July 
1975, Mercury and the Hospital entered into a contract for 
the construction of additions to the Hospital building. The 
contract, drafted by representatives of the Hospital, included 
V 
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provisions for resolving disputes arising out of the contract or 
its breach. All disputes involving interpretation of the con-
tract or performance of the construction work were to be re-
ferred in the first instance to J. N. Pease Associates ("Archi-
tect"), an independent architectural firm hired by the Hos-
pital to design and oversee the construction project. With 
certain stated exceptions, 1 any dispute decided by the Archi-
tect (or not decided by it within a stated time) could be sub-
mitted by either party to binding arbitration under a broad 
arbitration clause in the contract: 
"All claims, disputes and other matters in question 
arising out of, or relating to, this Contract or the breach 
thereof, . . . shall be decided by arbitration in accord-
ance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules 
of the American Arbitration Association then obtaining 
unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. This 
agreement to arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable 
under the prevailing arbitration law. The award ren-
dered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment 
may be entered upon it in accordance with applicable law 
in any court having jurisdiction thereof." App. 29-30. 
The contract also specified the time limits for arbitration 
demands. 2 
1 The Architect was given final say on "matters relating to artistic ef-
fect." App. 28-29. The contract also excluded arbitration on any claim 
waived by the making or acceptance of final payment. App. 29. Neither 
of these exceptions is asserted to apply in this case. 
2 The contract provided that no demand for arbitration could be made 
later than thirty days after the Architect's written final decision. In the 
case of arbitrable disputes not subject to submission to the Architect, the 
demand was required to be made "within a reasonable time after the claim 
... has arisen," and in no event after the applicable statute of limitations 
had run. App. 29--30. 
The contract also set a starting time limit for arbitration demands. No 
demand could be made earlier than ten days after presentation of evidence 
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Construction on the project began in July 1975. Perform-
ance was to be completed by October 1979. 3 In fact, con-
struction was substantially completed in February 1979, and 
final inspections were made that June. 
At a meeting in October 1977 (during construction), at-
tended by representatives of Mercury, the Hospital, and the 
Architect, Mercury agreed, at the Architect's request, to 
withhold its claims for delay and impact costs (i. e., claims for 
extended overhead or increase in construction costs due to 
delay or inaction by the Hospital) until the work was substan-
tially completed. On this record, the Hospital does not con-
test the existence of this agreement, although it asserts that 
the Architect lacked authority to agree to a delay in presen-
tation of claims or to entertain claims after the contract work 
was completed. 
In January 1980, Mercury submitted to the Architect its 
claims for delay and impact costs. Mercury and the Archi-
tect discussed the claims over several months, substantially 
reducing the amount of the claims. According to the Hospi-
tal, it first learned of the existence of Mercury's claims in 
April 1980; its lawyers assumed active participation in the 
claim procedure in May. The parties differ in their charac-
terizations of the events of the next few months-whether 
there were "ongoing negotiations," or merely an "investiga-
tion" by the Hospital. In any event, it appears from the 
record that lawyers for the Hospital requested additional 
information concerning Mercury's claims. As a result, on 
August 12, 1980, Mercury gave a detailed presentation of its 
claims at a meeting attended by Mercury's representatives 
and lawyers, the Hospital's representatives and lawyers, and 
to the Architect, unless the Architect rendered a written decision before 
that time. App. 29. 
3 The completion date, originally set as November 14, 1978, was ex-
tended to October 1979 by agreement of the parties. 
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representatives of the Architect. Mercury agreed to send 
copies of its files to an expert hired by the Hospital, and the 
parties agreed to meet again on October 13. 
On October 6, Mercury's counsel telephoned the Hospital's 
counsel to confirm that the scheduled meeting would go for-
ward. The Hospital's counsel said he would call back the 
next day. When he did, he informed Mercury's counsel that 
the Hospital would pay nothing on Mercury's claim. He also 
said that the Hospital intended to file a declaratory judgment 
action in North Carolina state court. 
True to its word, the Hospital filed an action on the morn-
ing of October 8 in the Superior Court of Guilford County, 
North Carolina, naming Mercury and the Architect as de-
fendants. The complaint alleged that Mercury's claim was 
without factual or legal basis and that it was barred by the 
statute of limitations. It alleged that Mercury had lost any 
right to arbitration under the contract due to waiver, laches, 
estoppel, and failure to make a timely demand for arbitra-
tion. The complaint also alleged various delinquencies on 
the part of the Architect. As relief, the Hospital sought a 
declaration that there was no right to arbitration; a stay of 
arbitration; a declaration that the Hospital bore no liability to 
Mercury; and a declaration that if the Hospital should be 
found liable in any respect to Mercury, it would be entitled to 
indemnity from the Architect. The complaint was served on 
Mercury on October 9. On that same day, Mercury's counsel 
mailed a demand for arbitration. 
On October 15, without notice to Mercury, the Hospital ob-
tained an ex parte injunction from the state court forbidding 
Mercury to take any steps directed toward arbitration. 
Mercury objected, and the stay was dissolved on October 27. 
As soon as the stay was lifted, Mercury filed the present ac-
tion in the District Court, seeking an order compelling ar-
bitration under § 4 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 4. 4 
'Simultaneously, Mercury filed a petition for removal of the Hospital's 
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Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. On the 
Hospital's motion, the District Court stayed Mercury's 
federal-court suit pending resolution of the state-court suit 
because the two suits involved the identical issue of the 
arbitrability of Mercury's claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. 
A-38. 
Mercury sought review of the District Court's stay by both 
a notice of appeal and a petition for mandamus. A panel of 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard argument 
in the case, but before the panel issued any decision, the 
Court informed the parties that it would consider the case en 
bane. After reargument, the en bane Court held that it had 
appellate jurisdiction over the case under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. 
It reversed the District Court's stay order and remanded the 
case to the District Court with instructions for entry of an 
order to arbitrate. 
II 
Before we address the propriety of the District Judge's 
stay order, we must first decide whether that order was ap-
pealable to the Court of Appeals under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. 5 
Mercury sought appellate review through two alternative 
routes-a notice of appeal under § 1291, and a petition for 
mandamus under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651.6 
state-court action. The District Court remanded the removed case on the 
ground that, because the Hospital and the Architect are both North Caro-
lina corporations, there was no complete diversity. The propriety of the 
removal or remand is not before this Court. 
5 Section 1291 provides in relevant part: 
"The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final de-
cisions of the district courts of the United States, . . . except where a di-
rect review may be had in the Supreme Court." 
6 The Hospital argues that because Mercury's filing in the Court of Ap-
peals was styled a petition for mandamus first and a notice of appeal only 
"in the alternative," the Hospital was somehow entitled to have the Court 
of Appeals apply the stricter standards of review that obtain under the 
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Mercury expressly stated that its appeal was based only on 
§ 1291, and not on 18 U. S. C. § 1292 (relating to interlocu-
tory appeals). The Hospital contends that the order ap-
pealed from was not a "final decision" within § 1291. We dis-
agree and hold that the stay order was final for purposes of 
appellate jurisdiction. 
Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U. S. 713 (1962), is 
instructive in this regard. There the plaintiff brought a fed-
eral suit challenging the constitutionality of a state statute. 
The District Judge declined to convene a three-judge court 
and stayed the federal suit under the Pullman abstention 
doctrine. 7 We held that the District Court's action was final 
and therefore reviewable by the Court of Appeals, stating: 
"The Court of Appeals properly rejected the argument 
that the order of the District Court 'was not final and 
hence unappealable under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1291, 1292,' 
pointing out that '[a]ppellant was effectively out of 
court.'" Id., at 715, n. 2. 8 
mandamus procedure before considering any appeal. Brief for Petitioner 
30-31. We do not understand why this order of proceeding would be of 
any benefit to the Hospital; but in any event the contention is frivolous. 
In the first place, Mercury also filed a proper notice of appeal in the Dis-
trict Court, see Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3(a). More fundamentally, a court 
of appeals has no occasion to engage in extraordinary review by mandamus 
"in aid of [its] jurisdictio[n]," 28 U. S. C. § 1651, when it can exercise the 
same review by a contemporaneous ordinary appeal. See, e. g., Hines v. 
D'Artois, 531 F. 2d 726, 732, and n. 10 (CA5 1976). 
1 Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). 
8 The plaintiff in ldlewild had requested injunctive relief against en-
forcement of the state statute. Nevertheless, it is clear that neither the 
Court of Appeals nor this Court based the holding of appealability on the 
argument that the District Court had effectively denied injunctive relief. 
See generally 28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(l); Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 
450 U. S. 79 (1981). Section 1292 in terms applies only to interlocutory 
orders, and therefore could hardly have been the basis for a holding that 
the orders were "final." 
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Here, the argument for finality of the District Court's 
order is even clearer. A district court stay pursuant to Pull-
man abstention is entered with the expectation that the fed-
eral litigation will resume in the event that the plaintiff does 
not obtain relief in state court on state-law grounds. 9 Here, 
by contrast, the District Court predicated its stay order on 
its conclusion that the federal and state actions involved "the 
identical issue of arbitrability of the claims of Mercury Con-
struction Corp. against the Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospi-
tal." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-38. That issue of arbitrabil-
ity was the only substantive issue present in the federal suit. 
Hence, a stay of the federal suit pending resolution of the 
state suit meant that there would be no further litigation in 
the federal forum; the state court's judgment on the issue 
would be res judicata. 10 Thus, here, even more surely than 
in ldlewild, Mercury was "effectively out of court." Hence, 
as the Court of Appeals held, this stay order amounts to a 
dismissal of the suit. 11 
9 See England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964). 
10 See, e.g., Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v .. Meyer, 664 F. 2d 1176, 
1183-1184 (CAll 1981); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Haydu, 637 F. 2d 391, 397-398 (CA5 1981). 
"See In re Mercury Construction Corp., 656 F. 2d 933, 937-938, and n. 
6 (CA4 1981), citing as dispositive Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F. 2d 103, 10~106 
(CA41967). See also Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 
597 F. 2d 798, 808, and n. 15 (CA2 1979); Baltimore Bank for Cooperatives 
v. Farmers Cheese Cooperative, 583 F. 2d 104, 108-109 (CA3 1978); Sun 
Oil Co. v. FEA, 572 F. 2d 867 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1978); Rancho Pa-
los Verdes Corp. v. Laguna Beach, 547 F. 2d 1092, 1093, n. 1(CA91976); 
Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F. 2d 726, 730-732 (CA5 1976); Drexler v. South-
west Dubois School Corp., 504 F. 2d 836,838 (CA71974) (en bane); Druker 
v. Sullivan, 458 F. 2d 1272, 1274, n. 3 (CAl 1972). But see Acton Corp. v. 
Borden, Inc., 670 F. 2d 377, 380-382 (CAl 1982); State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Scholes, 601 F. 2d 1151, 1153-1154 (CAlO 
1979); Frederick L. v. Thomas, 578 F. 2d 513, 51~16 (CA3 1978) 
(dictum). 
Of course, as these cases recognize, Idlewild does not disturb the usual 
rule that a stay is not ordinarily a final decision for purposes of§ 1291, since 
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In any event, if the District Court order were not final for 
appealability purposes, it would nevertheless be appealable 
within the exception to the finality rule under Cohen v. Bene-
ficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). The factors re-
quired to show finality under this exception have been sum-
marized as follows: 
"To come within the 'small class' of decisions excepted 
from the final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must 
conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an 
important issue completely separate from the merits of 
the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal 
from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978) (footnote omitted). 12 
There can be no dispute that this order meets the second 
and third of these criteria. An order that amounts to a re-
fusal to adjudicate the merits plainly presents an important 
issue separate from the merits. 13 For the same reason, this 
order would be entirely unreviewable if not appealed now. 
Once the state court decided the issue of arbitrability, the 
federal court· would be bound to honor that determination as 
res judicata. 
The Hospital contends nevertheless that the District 
Court's stay order did not meet the first of the criteria, 
namely that it "conclusively determine the disputed ques-
most stays do not put the plaintiff "effectively out of court." See, e. g., 
Amdurs, 372 F. 2d, at 105-106. ldlewi,ld's reasoning is limited to cases 
where (under Colorado River, abstention, or a closely similar doctrine) the 
object of the stay is to require all or a substantial part of the federal suit to 
be litigated in a state forum. 
12 Accord, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 375 
(1981); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U. S. 850, 854-855 (1978); Abney 
v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 658--659 (1977). 
13 The "completely separate from the merits" requirement is a distillation 
of the principle that there should not be piecemeal review of "steps towards 
final judgment in which they will merge." Cohen v. Beneficial Loan 
Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949). In this case, of course, there is no step 
towards final judgment, but a refusal to proceed at all. 
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tion." But this is true only in the technical sense that every 
order short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the dis-
cretion of the district judge. 14 In this case, however, there is 
no basis to suppose that the District Judge contemplated any 
reconsideration of his decision to def er to the parallel state-
court suit. He surely would not have made that decision in 
the first instance unless he had expected the state court to 
resolve all relevant issues adequately. It is not clear why 
the Judge chose to stay the case rather than to dismiss it out-
right; for all that the record shows, there was no reason other 
than the form of the Hospital's motion. Whatever the rea-
son, however, the practical effect of his order was entirely 
the same for present purposes, and the order was appealable. 
See infra, at Part IVE. 
III 
We turn now to the principal issue to be addressed, namely 
the propriety of the District Court's decision to stay this fed-
eral suit out of deference to the parallel litigation brought in 
14 See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(b); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478, at 788-792 (1981). 
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), held that the Cohen 
rule did not apply to a class decertification order because, among other rea-
sons, such an order is "inherently tentative" under Federal Rule of Civ. 
Procedure 23(c)(l), which provides that such an order may be "altered or 
amended before the decision on the merits." 437 U. S., at 469, and n. 11. 
Of course, as Rule 54(b) provides, virtually all interlocutory orders may be 
altered or amended before final judgment if sufficient cause is shown; yet 
that does not make all pretrial orders "inherently tentative" in the sense of 
that phrase in Coopers & Lybrand. The rationale behind Rule 23(c)(l) is 
that a certification decision should be made "[a]s soon as practicable," even 
though later events or discoveries may mandate a different result. Many 
other orders, by contrast, are made with the expectation that they will be 
the final word on the subject addressed. Certainly that was the case with 
the order at issue in this case. The reasoning of Coopers & Lybrand does 
not reach all pretrial orders that are formally subject to revision, but only 
those as to which some revision might reasonably be expected in the ordi-
nary course of litigation. 
81-120~PINION 
10 MOSES H. CONE HOSPITAL v. MERCURY CONSTR. CORP. 
state court. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. 
United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976) provides persuasive guid-
ance in deciding this question. 
A 
Colorado River involved the effect of the McCarran 
Amendment, 66 Stat. 560, 43 U. S. C. § 666, on the existence 
and exercise of federal-court jurisdiction to adjudicate federal 
water rights, 28 U. S. C. § 1345. The Amendment waives 
the Government's sovereign immunity to permit the joinder 
of the United States in some state-court suits for the adjudi-
cation of water rights. In Colorado River, however, the 
Government proceeded in Federal District Court, bringing 
suit against some 1,000 nonfederal water users, seeking a 
declaration of the water rights of certain federal entities and 
Indian tribes. Shortly thereafter, a defendant in that suit 
sought to join the United States in a state-court proceeding 
for the comprehensive adjudication and administration of all 
water rights within the river system that was the subject of 
the federal-court suit. The District Court dismissed the fed-
eral suit, holding that the abstention doctrine required defer-
ence to the state-court proceedings. The Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the suit of the 
United States was within the District Court's jurisdiction 
under 28 U. S. C. § 1345 and that abstention was inappropri-
ate. We reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
affirmed the judgment of the District Court dismissing the 
complaint. 
We began our analysis by examining the abstention doc-
trine in its various forms. We noted: 
"Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is 
the exception, not the rule. 'The doctrine of abstention, 
under which a District Court may decline to exercise or 
postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordi-
nary and narrow exception to the duty of a District 
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Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. 
Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justi-
fied under this doctrine only in the exceptional circum-
stances where the order to the parties to repair to the 
State court would clearly serve an important counter-
vailing interest.' " 15 
After canvassing the three categories of abstention, we con-
cluded that none of them applied to the case at hand. 424 
U.S., at 813-817. 16 
Nevertheless, we held that the District Court's dismissal 
was proper on another ground-one resting not on consider-
ations of state-federal comity or on avoidance of constitu-
tional decisions, as does abstention, but on "considerations of 
'[ w ]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation 
of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litiga-
tion.' " 17 We noted that " 'the pend ency of an action in the 
state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same mat-
ter in the Federal court having jurisdiction,"' and that the 
federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation ... to 
exercise the jurisdiction given them." 18 We continued: 
"Given this obligation, and the absence of weightier con-
siderations of constitutional adjudication and state-fed-
eral relations, the circumstances permitting the dis-
missal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concur-
rent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial 
administration are considerably more limited than the 
'"Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 
U. S. 800, 813 (1976), quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda 
Co., 360 U. S. 185, 188-189 (1959). 
16 There is no contention here that any of the categories of the abstention 
doctrine apply to this case. 
17 Colorado River, 424 U. S., at 817, quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. 
C-0-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U. S. 180, 183 (1952). 
18 Colorado River, 424 U.S., at 817, quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 
u. s. 268, 282 (1910). 
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circumstances appropriate for abstention. The former 
circumstances, though exceptional, do nevertheless 
exist." Id., at 818. 
We declined to prescribe a hard and fast rule for dismissals of 
this type, but instead described some of the factors relevant 
to the decision. 
"It has been held, for example, that the court first as-
suming jurisdiction over property may exercise that ju-
risdiction to the exclusion of other courts. . . . In as-
sessing the appropriateness of dismissal in the event of 
an exercise of concurrent jurisdiction, a federal court 
may also consider such factors as the inconvenience of 
the federal forum; the desirability of avoiding piecemeal 
litigation; and the order in which jurisdiction was ob-
tained by the concurrent forums. No one factor is nec-
essarily determinative; a carefully considered judgment 
taking into account both the obligation to exercise juris-
diction and the combination of factors counselling against 
that exercise is required. Only the clearest of justifica-
tions will warrant dismissal." Id., at 818--819 (empha-
sis added; citations omitted). 
As this passage makes clear, the decision whether to dis-
miss a federal action because of parallel state-court litigation 
does not rest on a mechanical checklist, but on a careful bal-
ancing of the important factors as they apply in a given case, 
with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of 
jurisdiction. The weight to be given to any one factor may 
vary greatly from case to case, depending on the particular 
setting of the case. Colorado River itself illustrates this 
principle in operation. By far the most important factor in 
our decision to approve the dismissal there was the "clear 
federal policy ... [of] avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of 
water rights in a river system," id., at 819, as evinced in the 
McCarran Amendment. We recognized that the Amend-
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ment represents Congress's judgment that the field of water 
rights is one peculiarly appropriate for comprehensive treat-
ment in the forums having the greatest experience and ex-
pertise, assisted by state administrative officers acting under 
the state courts. Id., at 819-820. In addition, we noted 
that other factors in the case tended to support dismissal-
the absence of any substantial progress in the federal-court 
litigation; the presence in the suit of extensive rights gov-
erned by state law; the geographical inconvenience of the fed-
eral forum; and the Government's previous willingness to liti-
gate similar suits in state court. Id., at 820. 
B 
Before discussing the application of Colorado Rivers ex-
ceptional-circumstances test, we must address the Hospital's 
argument that that test was undermined by our subsequent 
decision in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U. S. 655 
· (1978). We find no merit in this argument for at least two 
reasons. 
The Hospital relies on the opinion of JUSTICE REHNQUIST, 
announcing the judgment of the Court. The Hospital argues 
that JUSTICE REHNQUIST's opinion, if not expressly overrul-
ing Colorado River, at least modifies its holding substan-
tially. But it is clear that a majority of the Court reaffirmed 
the Colorado River test in Calvert. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's 
opinion commanded only four votes. It was opposed by the 
dissenting opinion, in which four Justices concluded that the 
Calvert District Court's stay was impermissible under Colo-
rado River. 437 u. s., at 66~69, 672-674 (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting). JUSTICE BLACKMUN, although concurring in 
the judgment, agreed with the dissent that Colorado Rivers 
exceptional-circumstances test was controlling; he voted to 
remand to permit the District Court to apply the Colorado 
River factors in the first instance. 19 Id., at 667-668. On re-
19 The decision in Colorado River came down after the District Court's 
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mand, the Court of Appeals correctly recognized that the 
four dissenting Justices and JUSTICE BLACKMUN formed a 
majority to require application of the Colorado River test. 
Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will, 586 F. 2d 12 (CA7 
1978). 20 
Even on the basis of JUSTICE REHNQUIST's opinion, how-
ever, there is an obvious distinction between Calvert and this 
case. The key to Calvert was the standard for issuance of a 
writ of mandamus under 28 U. S. C. § 1651.21 As JUSTICE 
stay order in Calvert but before the Court of Appeals issued its mandamus 
-· in that case. 
20 On remand from our decision in Calvert, the District Court and Court 
of Appeals concluded that the stay should be continued, but rested that de-
cision on a ground not addressed in the prior Court of Appeals decision 
(Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will, 560 F. 2d 792 (CA7 1977)) or in any of 
this Court's opinions in the case. They concluded that the filing of the fed-
eral suit was a "defensive tactical maneuver" based on a contrived federal 
claim; hence, a stay was called for as "a means to deter vexatious use of the 
federal courts." The courts also noted that, in the interim, the basis for 
the plaintiffs assertion of exclusive federal jurisdiction had vanished. 
Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co., 600 F. 
2d 1228, 1234-1236 (CA71979), affg 459 F. Supp. 859 (ND Ill. 1978). The 
case did not come before this Court for review a second time. 
The Court of Appeals in this case relied on similar reasoning. It con-
cluded that, despite chronological priority of filing, the Hospital's state-
court suit was a contrived, defensive reaction to Mercury's expected claim 
for relief and for arbitration. 656 F. 2d, at 944-945. 
The reasoning of the Courts of Appeals in this case and in Calvert-that 
the vexatious or reactive nature of either the federal or the state litigation 
may influence the decision whether to defer to a parallel state litigation 
under Colorado River-has considerable merit. We need not rely on such 
reasoning here, however, for we conclude infra that even if the Hospital 
acted in complete good faith there were no exceptional circumstances war-
ranting the District Court's stay. 
21 The Court of Appeals in Calvert had held that it lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain an ordinary appeal, apparently because a portion of the federal 
litigation was the subject of exclusive federal jurisdiction and would there-
fore remain to be disposed of in federal court after the conclusion of state-
court proceedings. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will, 560 F. 2d 792, 794 
(CA7 1977), citing Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Assn., 526 F. 2d 
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REHNQUIST stressed, such extraordinary writs are used in 
aid of appellate jurisdiction only to confine an inferior court to 
a lawful exercise of its prescribed authority, or to compel it to 
exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so. The 
movant must show that his right to the writ is clear and indis-
putable. 437 U. S., at 661-662, 664, 665-666 (opinion of 
REHNQUIST, J.). JUSTICE REHNQUIST concluded that that 
the movant in Calvert had failed to meet this burden. At the 
same time, he noted that the movant might have succeeded 
on a proper appeal. Id., at 665. In this case we have held 
that the Court of Appeals did have appellate jurisdiction; it 
properly exercised that jurisdiction to find that the District 
Court's stay was impermissible under Colorado River. 
The Hospital further contends that Calvert requires rever-
sal here because the opinions of JUSTICE REHNQUIST and 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN require greater deference to the discre-
tion of the District Court than was given by the Court of Ap-
peals in this case. Under both Calvert and Colorado River, 
of course, the decision whether to defer to the state courts is 
necessarily left to the discretion of the district court in the 
first instance. Yet to say that the district court has discre-
tion is not to say that its decision is unreviewable; such dis-
cretion must be exercised under the relevant standard pre-
scribed by this Court. In this case, the relevant standard is 
Colorado Rivers exceptional-circumstances test, as eluci-
dated by the factors discussed in that case. As we shall now 
explain, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the District 
Court in this case abused its discretion in granting the stay. 
IV 
Applying the Colorado River factors to this case, it is clear 
that there was no showing of the requisite exceptional cir-
537, 540 (CA3 1975). Cf. Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corp., 504 
F. 2d 836, 838 (CA 7 1974) (en bane) (stay oflitigation pending exhaustion of 
state remedies is final under ldlewild). The issue of appellate jurisdiction 
was not presented to this Court in Calvert. 
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cumstances to justify the District Court's stay. 
The Hospital concedes that the first two factors mentioned 
in Colorado River are not present here. There was no as-
sumption by either court of jurisdiction over any res or prop-
erty, nor is there any contention that the federal forum was 
any less convenient to the parties than the state forum. The 
remaining factors-avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and the 
order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent fo-
rums-far from supporting the stay, actually counsel against 
it. 
A 
There is no force here to the consideration that was para-
mount in Colorado River itself-the danger of piecemeal 
litigation. 
The Hospital points out that it has two substantive dis-
putes here--one with Mercury, concerning Mercury's claim 
for delay and impact costs, and the other with the Architect, 
concerning the Hospital's claim for indemnity for any liability 
it may have to Mercury. The latter dispute cannot be sent 
to arbitration without the Architect's consent, since there is 
no arbitration agreement between the Hospital and the Ar-
chitect. It is true, therefore, that if Mercury obtains an ar-
bitration order for its dispute, the Hospital will be forced to 
resolve these related disputes in different forums. That mis-
fortune, however, is not the result of any choice between the 
federal and state courts; it occurs because the relevant fed-
eral law requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give 
effect to an arbitration agreement. 22 Under the Arbitration 
Act, an arbitration agreement must be enforced notwith-
standing the presence of other persons who are parties to the 
22 This provides a sharp contrast with the key statute at issue in Colo-
rado River-the McCarran Amendment. There, as we stressed, the pri-
mary policy of the statute was the avoidance of piecemeal litigation. 424 
U. S., at 819-820. 
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underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement. 23 If 
the dispute between Mercury and the Hospital is arbitrable 
under the Act, then the Hospital's two disputes will be re-
solved separately-one in arbitration, and the other (if at all) 
in state-court litigation. Conversely, if the dispute between 
Mercury and the Hospital is not arbitrable, then both dis-
putes will be resolved in state court. But neither of those 
two outcomes depends at all on which court decides the ques-
tion of arbitrability. Hence, a decision to allow that issue to 
be decided in state rather than federal court accomplishes ab-
solutely nothing in the way of avoiding piecemeal resolution 
of disputes. 
B 
The order in which the concurrent tribunals obtained and 
exercised jurisdiction cuts against, not for, the District 
Court's stay in this case. The Hospital argues that the stay 
was proper because the state-court suit was filed some 19 
days before the federal suit. In the first place, this argu-
ment disregards the obvious reason for the Hospital's prior-
ity in filing. An indispensable element of Mercury's cause of 
action under § 4 for an arbitration order is the Hospital's re-
fusal to arbitrate. Seen. 27, infra. That refusal did not oc-
cur until less than a day before the Hospital filed its state 
suit. Hence, Mercury simply had no reasonable opportunity 
to file its § 4 petition first. Moreover, the Hospital sue-
23 E.g., C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan International Co., 552 F. 2d 1228, 
1231-1232 (CA7 1977); Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Industries, Inc., 514 
F. 2d 614,617 (CAl 1975); Hamilton Life Insurance Company v. Republic 
National Life Insurance Co., 408 F. 2d 606, 609 (CA2 1969). 
In some cases, of course, it may be advisable to stay litigation among the 
non-arbitrating parties pending the outcome of the litigation. That deci-
sion is one left to the district court (or to the state trial court under appli-
cable state procedural rules) as a matter of its discretion to control its 
docket. See generally Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248, 
254-255 (1936). 
81-120~OPINION 
18 MOSES H. CONE HOSPITAL v. MERCURY CONSTR. CORP. 
ceeded in obtaining an ex parte injunction from the state 
court forbidding Mercury from taking any steps to secure ar-
bitration. 24 Mercury filed its § 4 petition the same day that 
the injunction was dissolved. 25 
That aside, the Hospital's priority argument gives too me-
chanical a reading to the "priority" element of the Colorado 
River balance. This factor, as with the other Colorado 
River factors, is to be applied in a pragmatic, flexible manner 
with a view to the realities of the case at hand. Thus, prior-
ity should not be measured exclusively by which complaint 
was filed first, but rather in terms of how much progress has 
been made in the two actions. Colorado River illustrates 
this point well. There, the federal suit was actually filed 
first. Nevertheless, we pointed out as a factor favoring dis-
missal "the apparent absence of any proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court, other than the filing of the complaint, prior to the 
motion to dismiss." 424 U. S., at 820. Here, the opposite 
was true. It was the state-court suit in which no substantial 
proceedings (excepting only the abortive temporary injunc-
tion) had taken place at the time of the decision to stay. In 
the federal suit, by contrast, the parties had taken most of 
the steps necessary to a resolution of the arbitrability issue. 26 
24 Of course we do not mean to say that the state court's injunction could 
properly have been applied to prevent Mercury from filing or prosecuting a 
federal lawsuit. See General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U. S. 12 (1977); 
Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U. S. 408 (1964). Mercury was not 
obliged, however, to put itself in danger of contempt sanctions merely in 
order to cut short the period of the Hospital's priority of filing. 
26 See also n. 20 supra. 
28 Under § 6 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 6, Mercury's application 
for a § 4 order was properly treated procedurally as a motion. Mercury 
submitted affidavits, legal briefs, and documentary evidence in support of 
the order sought. The Hospital responded with full briefing and extensive 
evidentiary submissions on the arbitrability issue, and it requested oral ar-
gument and a jury trial. At the same time, it made its successful motion 
for a stay. It is readily apparent that if the District Court had denied the 
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In realistic terms, the federal suit was running well ahead of 
the state suit at the very time that the District Court decided 
to refuse to adjudicate the case. 
This refusal to proceed was plainly erroneous in view of 
Congress's clear intent, in the Arbitration Act, to move the 
parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitra-
tion as quickly and easily as possible. The Act provides two 
parallel devices for enforcing an arbitration agreement: a 
stay of litigation in any case raising a dispute referrable to 
arbitration, 9 U. S. C. § 3, and an affirmative order to engage 
in arbitration, § 4. Both of these sections call for an expe-
ditious and summary hearing, with only restricted inquiry 
into factual issues. 'l:1 Assuming that the state court would 
have granted prompt relief to Mercury under the Act, 28 there 
still would have been an inevitable delay as a result of the 
stay, it doubtless could and should have gone on to decide the arbitrability 
point in very short order. 
l?7 Section 3 provides that if a suit is brought on the merits of a dispute 
covered by an arbitration agreement, 
"the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue 
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an 
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the 
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of 
the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in pro-
ceeding with such arbitration." 9 U. S. C. § 3. 
Section 4 provides that a district court must enter an order to arbitrate 
"upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or 
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue." If either of these points is 
in issue, § 4 provides that "the court shall proceed summarily" to a trial on 
that point. Section 6 further provides that a request for relief under ei-
ther § 3 or § 4 is to be treated procedurally as a motion. 
Moreover, the policy of the Arbitration Act requires a liberal reading of 
arbitration agreements, see infra, at 20-21. As a result, some issues that 
might be thought relevant to arbitrability are themselves arbitrable-fur-
ther speeding the procedure under §§ 3 and 4. See, e. g., Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
ZB See n. 34, infra; but cf. nn. 35--36, infra. 
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District Court's stay. The stay thus frustrated the statutory 
policy of rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration 
agreements. 
C 
Besides the four factors expressly discussed in Colorado 
River, there is another that emerges from Calvert-the fact 
that federal law provides the rule of decision on the merits. 
The state-versus-federal-law factor was of ambiguous rele-
vance in Colorado River. 29 In Calvert, however, both the 
four-vote dissenting opinion and JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S opin-
ion concurring in the judgment pointed out that it is ordi-
narily inappropriate to defer to state courts for the resolution 
of rights under federal law, especially where federal jurisdic-
tion over the claims at stake is exclusive. 437 U. S., at 667 
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 668--677 
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting). See also Colorado River, 424 
U. S., at 815, n. 21; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 
u. s. 668, 672-674 (1963). 
The basic issue presented in Mercury's federal suit was the 
arbitrability of the dispute between Mercury and the Hospi-
tal. Federal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs 
that issue in either state or federal court. Section 2 is the 
primary substantive provision of the Act, declaring that a 
written agreement to arbitrate "in any maritime transaction 
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce 
... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract." 9 U. S. C. § 2. 30 Section 2 is a congressional 
29 The federal/state-law point was of little guidance in Colorado River for 
two reasons. First, there was an affirmative policy in federal law ex-
pressly approving litigation of federal water rights in state court-the 
McCarran Amendment. Second, although the water rights of the United 
States and the Indian tribes were governed in part by federal law, the bulk 
of the litigation would necessarily revolve around the state-law water 
rights of the thousand nonfederal parties in the case-a factor on which we 
expressly relied in approving the District Court's stay. 424 U. S., at 820. 
30 "Maritime transaction" and "commerce" are defined in § 1 of the Ar-
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declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or proce-
dural policies to the contrary. The effect of the section is to 
create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, ap-
plicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of 
the Act. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. 
Corp., 388 U. S. 395 (1967), for example, the parties had 
signed a contract containing an arbitration clause, but one 
party alleged that there had been fraud in the inducement of 
the entire contract (although the alleged fraud did not go to 
the arbitration clause in particular). The issue before us was 
whether the issue of fraud in the inducement was itself an ar-
bitrable controversy. We held that the language and poli-
cies of the Act required the conclusion that the fraud issue is 
arbitrable. Id., at 402--404. Although our holding in Prima 
Paint extended only to the specific issue presented, the 
courts of appeals have since consistently concluded that ques-
tions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard 
for the federal policy favoring arbitration. We agree. Any 
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be re-
solved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is 
the construction of the contract language itself or an allega-
tion of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability. 31 
To be sure, the source-of-law factor has less significance 
here than in Calvert, since the federal courts' jurisdiction to 
enforce the Arbitration Act is concurrent with that of the 
bitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 1. 
31 E . g., Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F. 2d 638, 643 (CA7 
1981); Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc ., 605 F . 2d 166, 168 (CA5 1979); 
Becker Autoradio U. S. A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F . 
2d 39, 43--45 (CA3 1978); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 174 U. S. App. D. C. 
253, 266, 531 F. 2d 585, 598 (1976); Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Industries, 
Inc ., 514 F. 2d 614, 616-617 (CAl 1975); Germany v. River Terminal R. 
Co., 477 F. 2d 546, 547 (CA61973); Coenen v. R . W. Pressprich & Co., 453 
F. 2d 1209, 1211-1212 (CA2), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 949 (1972); Hart v. 
Orion Insurance Co., 453 F. 2d 1358, 1360-1361 (CAl0 1971). 
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state courts. 32 But we emphasize that our task in cases such 
as this is not to find some substantial reason for the exercise 
of federal jurisdiction by the district court; rather, the task is 
to ascertain whether there exist "exceptional" circumstances, 
the "clearest of justifications," that can suffice under Colo-
rado River to justify the surrender of that jurisdiction. The 
mere fact that state law governs the merits is not alone 
enough to warrant that surrender; whereas the fact that fed-
eral law governs should be a major consideration militating 
against it. 33 
D 
Finally, in this case an important reason against allowing a 
stay is the probable inadequacy of the state-court proceeding 
to protect Mercury's rights. We are not to be understood to 
impeach the competence or procedures of the North Carolina 
courts. Moreover, state courts, as much as federal courts, 
are obliged to grant stays of litigation under § 3 of the Ar-
bitration Act. 34 It is less clear, however, whether the same 
32 See n. 34, infra. 
The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-
court jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establish-
ing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does 
not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) or otherwise. Section 4 provides for an order 
compelling arbitration only when the federal district court would have ju-
risdiction over a suit on the underlying dispute; hence, there must be diver-
sity of citizenship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction 
before the order can issue. E.g., Commercial Metals Co. V. Balfour, 
Guthrie, & Co., 577 F. 2d 264, 268--269 (CA5 1978), and cases cited. Sec-
tion 3 likewise limits the federal courts to the · extent that a federal court 
cannot stay a suit pending before it unless there is such a suit in existence. 
Nevertheless, although enforcement of the Act is left in large part to the 
state courts, it nevertheless represents federal policy to be vindicated by 
the federal courts where otherwise appropriate. 
We need not address whether a federal court might stay a state-court 
suit pending arbitration under 28 U. S. C. § 2283. 
33 Cf. n. 20, supra. 
34 Although § 3 refers ambiguously to a suit "in any of the courts of the 
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is true of an order to compel arbitration under § 4 of the Act. 36 
We need not resolve that question here; it suffices to say that 
there was, at a minimum, substantial room for doubt that 
Mercury could obtain from the state court an order compel-
ling the Hospital to arbitrate. 36 In many cases, no doubt, a 
§ 3 stay is quite adequate to protect the right to arbitration. 
But in a case such as this, where the party opposing arbitra-
tion is the one from whom payment or performance is sought, 
a stay of litigation alone is not enough. It leaves the recalci-
United States," the state courts have almost unanimously recognized that 
the stay provision of § 3 applies to suits in state as well as federal courts, 
requiring them to issue the same speedy relief when a dispute is referrable 
to arbitration. (The North Carolina Supreme Court has so held, although 
not until after the District Court ordered this stay. Burke County Public 
Schools Board of Education v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408,279 S.E. 
2d 816 (1981).) This is necessary to carry out Congress's intent to man-
date enforcement of all covered arbitration agreements; Congress can 
hardly have meant that an agreement to arbitrate can be enforced against a 
party who attempts to litigate an arbitrable dispute in federal court but not 
against one who sues on the same dispute in state court. See also Prima 
Paint, 388 U. S., at 404. 
36 Section 4, unlike § 3, speaks only of a petition to "any United States 
district court." Nonetheless, at least one state court has held that§ 4 does 
require state courts to issue § 4 orders to arbitrate where the section's con-
ditions are met. Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 67 
Cal. App. 3d 19, 24-25, 136 Cal. Rptr. 378, 380-381 (1977). 
""As a historical matter, there was considerable doubt at the time of the 
District Court's stay that the North Carolina court would have granted 
even a § 3 stay of litigation. The then-controlling precedent in North Car-
olina was to the effect that a contract such as that between Mercury and 
the Hospital was not subject to the Arbitration Act at all, on the reasoning 
that a construction project is not "commerce'.' within the meaning of §§ 1 
and 2 of the Act. Burke County Public Schools Board of Education v. 
Shaver Partnership, 46 N.C. App. 573, 265 S.E. 2d 481 (1980); Bryant-
Durham Electric Co. v. Durham County Hospital Corp., 42 N.C. App. 
351, 256 S.E. 2d 529 (1979). The North Carolina Supreme Court has, how-
ever, since repudiated those decisions. Burke County Public Schools 
Board of Education v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E. 2d 816 
(1981). 
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trant party free to sit and do nothing-neither to litigate nor 
to arbitrate. If the state court stayed litigation pending ar-
bitration but declined to compel the Hospital to arbitrate, 
Mercury would have no sure way to proceed with its claims 
except to return to federal court to obtain a § 4 order-a 
pointless and wasteful burden on the supposedly summary 
and speedy procedures prescribed by the Arbitration Act. 
E 
The Hospital argues that the Colorado River test is some-
how inapplicable because in this case the District Court 
merely stayed the federal litigation rather than dismissing 
the suit outright, as in Colorado River. It contends that 
Mercury remains free to seek to reopen the federal suit on a 
showing that the state suit has failed to adjudicate its rights, 
and that a stay is less onerous than a dismissal. We have 
already rejected this distinction, for purposes of this case, in 
discussing appellate jurisdiction. Supra, at 8-9. We reject 
it in this context for the same reasons. 
We have no occasion in this case to decide whether a dis-
missal or a stay should ordinarily be the preferred course of 
action when a district court properly finds that Colorado 
River counsels in favor of deferring to a parallel state-court 
suit. 37 We can say, however, that a stay is as much a refusal 
to exercise federal jurisdiction as a dismissal. When a dis-
trict court decides to dismiss or stay under Colorado River, it 
presumably concludes that the parallel state-court litigation 
will be an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt reso-
lution of the issues between the parties. If there is any sub-
stantial doubt as to this, it would be a serious abuse of discre-
tion to grant the stay or dismissal at all. See supra, at Part 
37 This reservation, of course, applies only to cases under Colorado 
River. Cf., e. g., American Trial Lawyers Assn. v. New Jersey Supreme 
Court, 409 U. S. 467 (1973) (stay rather than dismissal in Pullman 
abstention). 
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IV D; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 
674-676 (1963). Thus, the decision to invoke Colorado River 
necessarily contemplates that the federal court will have 
nothing further to do in resolving any substantive part of the 
case, whether it stays or dismisses. See 17 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure§ 4247, at 
517-519 (1978). 
Moreover, assuming that for some unexpected reason the 
state forum does turn out to be inadequate in some respect, 
the Hospital's argument fails to make out any genuine differ-
ence between a stay and a dismissal. It is true that Mercury 
could seek to return to federal court if it proved necessary; 
but that would be equally true if the District Court had dis-
missed the case. It is highly questionable whether this this 
Court would have approved a dismissal of a federal suit in 
Colorado River (or in any of the abstention cases, see supra, 
at 10-11) if the federal courts did not remain open to a dis-
missed plaintiff who later demonstrated the inadequacy of 
the state forum. 
V 
In addition to reversing the District Court's stay, the 
Court of Appeals decided that the underlying contractual dis-
pute between Mercury and the Hospital is arbitrable under 
the Arbitration Act and the terms of the parties' arbitration 
agreement. It reversed the District Court's judgment and 
remanded the case "with instructions to proceed in confor-
mity herewith." 656 F. 2d, at 946. In effect, the Court of 
Appeals directed the District Court to enter a § 4 order to 
arbitrate. 
In this Court, the Hospital does not contest the substan-
tive correctness of the Court of Appeals's holding on 
arbitrability. It does raise several objections to the proce-
dures the Court of Appeals used in considering and deciding 
this case. In particular, it points out that the only issue for-
mally appealed to the Court of Appeals was the propriety of 
the District Court's stay order. Ordinarily, we would not 
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expect the Court of Appeals to pass on issues not decided in 
the District Court. In the present case, however, we are 
not disposed to disturb the Court's discretion in its handling 
of the case in view of the special interests at stake and the 
apparent lack of any prejudice to the parties. 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2106 gives the courts of appeals some latitude in entering an 
order to achieve justice in the circumstances. The Arbitra-
tion Act calls for a summary and speedy disposition of mo-
tions or petitions to enforce arbitration clauses. The Court 
of Appeals had in the record full briefs and evidentiary sub-
missions from both parties on the merits of arbitrability, and 
held that there were no disputed issues of fact requiring a 
jury trial before a § 4 order could issue. Under these cir-
cumstances, the Court acted within its authority in deciding 
the legal issues presented in order to facilitate the prompt ar-
bitration that Congress envisaged. 
Affirmed. 
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